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The Surprising Significance of De
Minimis Tax Rules
Leigh Osofsky* & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas**
Abstract
De minimis tax rules—rules that eliminate tax burdens for
low-income taxpayers or low-dollar transactions—abound in the
tax law. Despite the prevalence of such rules, legal scholarship
has treated them as—well—de minimis, or as mere rounding
errors that do not merit sustained attention. This perspective is
understandable. If de minimis rules address insignificant
taxpayers or tax liabilities, aren’t the rules themselves likely to
be insignificant?
Recent tax law developments have revealed that this
conception of de minimis tax rules is deeply misguided. Major
allocations of tax law liability, as well as accompanying
questions about the fairness, efficiency, and administrability of
the tax system, turn on the existence and design of de minimis
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tax rules. In the wake of the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, for
example, astute industry players successfully lobbied the
Treasury Department to create de minimis tax rules, thereby
scoring significant monetary victories. De minimis tax rules like
these not only serve as low-salience giveaways but are also poorly
designed in a way that undermines the integrity of the tax
system.
The lack of scholarly attention to de minimis tax rules has
left this lobbying largely unchecked. There is no scholarly
framework evaluating existing de minimis tax rules. There is no
policy framework to help lawmakers decide why, when, or how
such rules should be made. And there is no separation of powers
framework analyzing when the Treasury Department has the
authority to create de minimis tax rules without express
Congressional authorization. This Article seeks to fill this gap by
analyzing de minimis tax rules along all of these dimensions. It
provides a framework for considering when de minimis tax rules
are preferable to other policy options and offers important design
considerations. Scholars can apply this analysis to the de
minimis tax rules that already pervade the Internal Revenue
Code and policymakers can use it to guide the many more they
will consider in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

The tax law purports to tax all income, from whatever
source derived.1 But as students of the tax law quickly learn,
that seemingly simple tenet gives way to numerous
complications and exceptions. Imagine, for example, that your
employer offers free coffee and pastries every Friday at the
office. Technically, the snacks constitute “income” and, as such,
should be taxable.2 But taxing an occasional croissant borders
on the absurd. Must the employer keep track of how many
pastries each employee eats? What about employees that don’t
drink coffee? Does the payroll department have to process the
value of the pastries and add it to the employee’s biweekly
paycheck? Will the employee pay Social Security taxes on a
portion of the coffee consumed?
The answer to all of these questions is “no”—because the
tax law treats the coffee and pastries as de minimis. Although
noncash compensation paid to employees is generally taxable,
the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) exempts any “de minimis
fringe,” defined as property or services with a value so small “as
to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively
impracticable.”3 In other words, de minimis fringes are small
benefits provided by an employer, like doughnuts in a company
break room, that are so minor that they are not worth keeping
track of for tax purposes.4
De minimis rules abound in the tax law. Like the rule for
de minimis fringes, many other de minimis rules exempt
taxpayers from a tax burden when the revenue at stake is not
worth the cost of complying with the law. Other de minimis tax
rules exempt taxpayers from particularly complex tax regimes
that are targeted at more sophisticated parties. For example,
the new “pass-through deduction” enacted as part of sweeping
tax reform in 2017 allows taxpayers below a certain income
threshold to avoid some of its most complicated provisions.5 The
1.
I.R.C. § 61(a).
2. See id. § 61(a)(1) (stating that gross income includes any
compensation for services including fringe benefits).
3. Id. § 132(a)(4), (e).
4. Id. § 132(e)(1).
5. See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
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Code and Treasury Regulations are replete with other examples
of de minimis exceptions.
Yet, despite their prevalence in the tax law, there is no
scholarly framework for analyzing de minimis tax rules. While
scholars have at times focused on particular de minimis tax
rules,6 they have not more generally examined the phenomenon:
Why do de minimis rules pervade the tax law? Why, when, and
how should they be created? And which actors have the
authority to create them?
At first blush, this lack of scholarly attention makes sense.
These are de minimis rules after all. Since de minimis rules
exempt insignificant taxpayers or transactions from otherwise
generally applicable law,7 scholars can be excused for thinking
that the rules themselves are relatively insignificant—the
equivalent of rounding errors in the design of the tax law.
Application of a de minimis rule may help a particular taxpayer,
the thought process would go, but comprehensively
understanding de minimis rules may not seem like it is of
particular importance to the tax system. But this conception is
deeply misguided. As this Article will illustrate, while de
minimis rules can serve an important role in the tax system,
they are also subject to significant problems with systemic
effects, which scholars and commentators have failed to
recognize.
This Article fills this gap in the literature. First, the Article
surveys existing de minimis tax rules and the various functions
of those rules. We find that most de minimis tax rules are

6. The de minimis fringe benefit rule has attracted particular attention.
See, e.g., Susan C. Morse & Leigh Osofsky, Regulating by Example, 35 YALE J.
ON REG. 127, 171–75 (2018) (exploring how Treasury has elaborated the
meaning of de minimis fringe benefits, which are excluded from gross income).
Another issue that has received some sustained focus is how to prevent states
from imposing use or sales taxes on de minimis activity that occurs in the
state. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local Reliance
on the Retail Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000
B.Y.U. L. REV. 77, 132–33 (exploring imposition of state use taxes for sales in
excess of de minimis amounts); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Tax Hangover:
Trailing Nexus, 33 VA. TAX REV. 497, 503–04 (2014) (proposing “a new
trailing-nexus standard” that “protects against the retained jurisdiction over
taxpayers with de minimis activity in a state”).
7. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1).
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intended to reduce administrative and compliance costs for both
taxpayers and the government when those costs are not justified
by the revenue at stake. Some de minimis tax rules are aimed
specifically at relieving taxpayers of compliance burdens like
filling out tax forms (what we call “procedural de minimis tax
rules”), while other de minimis tax rules are aimed at relieving
taxpayers of substantive tax obligations (what we call
“substantive de minimis tax rules”). De minimis tax rules may
exempt taxpayers and transactions from relatively simple rules
that impose high compliance burdens, or they may exempt
taxpayers from complex tax regimes when such taxpayers lack
sophistication. Finally, we find that some de minimis tax rules
appear to be more motivated by political considerations than
concerns about disproportionate compliance costs.
Having surveyed the function of existing de minimis tax
rules, we then turn to the drawbacks of such rules. We argue
that de minimis tax rules impose a number of unappreciated
costs on the tax system. First, by excepting out insignificant
taxpayers or transactions, de minimis tax rules also enable the
law that remains to be more burdensome than it otherwise
would be. This increased burden in the generally applicable law
has both efficiency and distributive implications. Second, de
minimis tax rules, such as the exclusion for de minimis fringes,
often fail to capture changes in industry and tax planning
practices, undermining the rule’s administrative benefits and
even supercharging inefficient tax planning.
In addition to these costs, de minimis tax rules are also
particularly prone to lobbying and may thus disproportionately
benefit insiders. Indeed, recent events have driven this point
home. At the end of 2017, Congress enacted the most sweeping
tax reform in over thirty years.8 While the legislation was
ambitious in scope, it left many fundamental design questions
unanswered.9 The legislation thus opened the door for industry
insiders to score even more victories than usual in the

8. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
9. Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making
of the Section 199A Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209, 211 (2019).
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administrative process.10 One way that insiders did so was by
lobbying for more advantageous, underlying tax rules.11 But
another way that such insiders did so was by arguing for de
minimis exceptions to the tax rules themselves. By lobbying for,
and getting, various de minimis tax rules, industry insiders
quietly, but significantly, changed the reach of the legislation.12
Finally, Congress clearly has the authority to craft
statutory de minimis rules, but many also exist in Treasury
regulations.13 We believe there is a strong argument that
Treasury actually does not have the authority to create many of
the regulatory de minimis tax rules that exist across the tax law.
This point may have a critical impact on tax administration.
Moreover, aside from questions of administrative authority, as
the 2017 tax reform reveals, Treasury crafting de minimis tax
rules can be problematic on political economy grounds. Creating
de minimis tax rules in the administrative process is a
particularly low salience way for industry insiders to gain
significant victories, undermining the integrity of the tax
system.
These issues with de minimis tax rules do not mean they
should be abandoned. Rather, policymakers should carefully
weigh the benefits of each de minimis tax rule against its costs
and consider whether a de minimis tax rule is preferable to
using less formal administrative discretion. We provide a
framework for making these evaluations and suggest particular
considerations that should apply in specific contexts. Moreover,
when policymakers do decide to adopt a de minimis tax rule, this
Article offers important design considerations. Among other
lessons, we explain that, based on our study, de minimis tax
rules should be subject to particular scrutiny when they benefit
sophisticated parties, they should be routinely evaluated for
10. See TCJA’s Business Tax Provisions: Design Flaws and Undemocratic
Implementation: Hearing on the Disappearing Corporate Income Tax Before
the H. Ways & Means Comm., 116th Cong. 3 (2020) (“This opened the door for
taxpayers with resources to influence significant influence over the regulatory
process, which lacks safeguards against such abuse.”).
11. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 190–193 and accompanying text.
13. Nonenforcement of small violations is discussed separately infra Part
IV.B.
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change over time, and procedural de minimis tax rules should
be more carefully crafted to minimize impacts on substantive
tax law.
At bottom, we argue that, far from being insignificant, de
minimis rules play an important role in the design of the tax law
and thus who bears the burdens and benefits of taxation.
Indeed, the notion that de minimis tax rules are relatively
insignificant serves only to perpetuate their proliferation. The
result, paradoxically, is a series of rules that, precisely by
professing to address insignificant taxpayers and transactions,
together have a profound, but largely unexamined, effect on the
tax system.14
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background
on de minimis tax rules and the existing scholarly framework
for such rules. Part II discusses de minimis tax rules in more
detail; it describes the functions of different types of de minimis
tax rules and illustrates these functions through a
non-exhaustive survey of existing rules. Part III then turns to
the drawbacks of de minimis tax rules, focusing particularly on
the unintended costs imposed by such rules. Part IV explores
when and how de minimis rules should be adopted, followed by
a brief conclusion.
OVERVIEW OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES

I.
A.

What Are De Minimis Tax Rules?

De minimis tax rules exempt small taxpayers or small
transactions from certain tax burdens. Perhaps the most
well-known of such rules is the exclusion for de minimis fringe
benefits under § 132 of the Internal Revenue Code.15 As
discussed above, that rule exempts both employers and
employees from having to keep records of and report small fringe

14. Cf. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures,
Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23, 23 (1966)
(exploring, in the context of market economics, how a series of small, seemingly
insignificant decisions, can yield large, undesirable effects).
15. I.R.C. § 132.
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benefits when the administrative burden of doing so does not
appear to justify the cost.16
Many de minimis tax rules carve out exceptions to tax
regimes that are otherwise complex, often to protect less
sophisticated parties from application of the complex rules.
Consider, as an example, the rules for interest-free loans under
Code § 7872. Imagine that a mother decides to give an
interest-free loan to her child who has recently graduated from
college. As a general rule, the tax law will pretend that the
foregone interest on such a loan has been gifted to the borrower
(the child) and repaid to the lender (the mother).17 This means
that, under the general rule for so-called “below-market loans,”
the mother’s generosity will actually generate a tax bill based
on phantom interest payments.18 As callous as this seems, this
is conceptually the right result. Without the rules, more
sophisticated taxpayers could transfer value to others without
the transfer being subject to taxation. For example, an employer
might extend an interest free loan to its employee to provide
compensation while avoiding employment taxes.19 The
below-market loan rules serve as a guardrail against this
potentially abusive tax planning.20
However, even if the below-market loan rules make sense
as an anti-abuse measure, they are far from intuitive. Many
taxpayers cannot understand an imaginary transfer of foregone
interest from the lender to the borrower, along with an
imaginary payment of interest by the borrower back to the
lender. And while the below-market loan rules might be
necessary in certain circumstances to prevent overly clever tax
planning, they are downright absurd as applied to others.
Imagine the unenviable job of an accountant who has to explain
to her client that the small loan made to a struggling adult child
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. § 7872.
Id.
STAFF OF

THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984 528 (J. Comm. Print 1984) (1984 TRA Bluebook).
20. See id. (“Under prior law, a transaction structured as a loan and a
payment in the nature of compensation often did not result in any tax
consequences for either the lender or the borrower.”).
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creates tax liability on foregone interest that the child
imaginarily paid.
To take such scenarios into account, de minimis rules
exempt many small transactions from the below-market loan
rules. For instance, interest is not imputed on gift loans between
individuals if the loan doesn’t exceed $10,000.21 This de minimis
rule, and others like it,22 except relatively insignificant
taxpayers or transactions from the general tax law that would
otherwise apply.23
Other de minimis rules exempt taxpayers from reporting
obligations, rather than substantive tax rules. For example,
consider the $600 reporting threshold for Form 1099-MISC.24
When businesses hire independent contractors to perform
services, the business generally must issue a Form 1099 to the
contractor and send a copy to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS); this allows the IRS to ensure that the income gets
properly reported on the contractor’s tax return.25 The 1099
requirement is sensible but it is not without costs for the payor,
who must collect tax information from the contractor and remit
the forms.26 These administrative costs make the requirement
harder to justify for small transactions; consider, for example, a
one-time payment to a contractor of $25. Accordingly, a de
minimis rule exempts payments from the 1099 requirement if

21. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2). The de minimis rule applies only if the aggregate
of all loans between the individuals does not exceed $10,000. Id. It does not
apply if the loan is used to purchase income-producing property, such as stock
or bonds. Id.
22. Another de minimis rule provides that, for loans between individuals
that do not exceed $100,000, imputed interest will not exceed the borrower’s
net investment income for the year. Id. § 7872(d). Further, if the borrower’s
net investment income is not over $1,000, the net investment income is treated
as zero for purposes of § 7872. Id. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii). This is a sensible result:
borrowers with minor amounts of investment income (less than $1,001) are
entitled to ignore it for purposes of triggering imputed interest on loans that
exceed the $10,000 de minimis threshold but do not exceed $100,000.
23. See id. § 7872(c)(2).
24. See id. § 6041(a).
25. Certain exceptions apply, such as payments made to a corporation.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(p)(1) (2006); infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.
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the aggregate amount paid to the contractor is less than $600.27
The $600 reporting threshold protects infrequent and low dollar
transactions from a filing burden when neither the
circumstances nor the tax revenue at issue seem to merit it.
De minimis rules are often statutory, but can be found in
Treasury regulations as well.28 Sometimes they are explicitly
described as “de minimis” (as in the case of de minimis fringe
benefits),29 and sometimes they function as de minimis without
use of the moniker (as in the case of the $600 threshold for Form
1099-MISC).30 Whether or not explicitly named as such, de
minimis tax rules include all statutes or regulations in which
Congress or Treasury has carved out a specific exemption from
a stated tax rule for an insignificant transaction or taxpayer.31
In most cases, the de minimis exemptions are defined by
reference to a dollar threshold that measures either the size of
the transaction (e.g., below-market loans under $10,000) or the
income of the taxpayer.
B.

Scholarly Framework

Despite the pervasiveness and variety of de minimis tax
rules, tax scholarship generally has not focused on them. There
are thousands of practitioner-oriented articles explaining the
details of particular de minimis tax rules.32 However, there is no
broad-based, theoretical examination of de minimis tax rules or
their role in the tax system.33
27. I.R.C. § 6041(a).
28. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6721-1(c) (2014) (exempting
“inconsequential errors or omissions” on information returns from penalties).
29. See id. § 1.132-6.
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2 (2020).
31. Similar action can be taken through less formal administrative
discretion (such as nonenforcement in certain situations). De minimis rules
are compared to less formal administrative discretion in infra Part IV.B.
32. A search of “‘de minimis’ w/10 tax” on Westlaw on April 13, 2020
produced 2,668 secondary sources. By and large they produced
practitioner-oriented articles that discussed particular de minimis rules,
generally in passing.
33. Limited articles attempt to draw any more general conclusions about
de minimis tax rules. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation
of Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIA. L. REV.
691, 719 (1998) (“Implementing any sensible tax regime for electronic
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To be sure, de minimis tax rules do connect with a broader
literature about how legal commands can be calibrated. This
literature suggests that not just the underlying legal content,
but also the form of that legal content takes, matters.34 For
instance, a legislature may wish to ban a certain type of
pollution. How this ban is crafted in legal terms will be
consequential. Early, canonical work suggested that such a ban
may be more rule-like or standard-like, with rules determining
legal content ex ante and standards determining such content
ex post.35 Under this framework, if the pollution is likely to be a
routine problem, rules are preferable, whereas if the pollution is
likely to be a variable issue, a standard may be preferable.36
The “rules/standards” literature is extensive, with many
nuances. Many have suggested a wide variety of implications of
rules versus standards. For instance, rules allocate more
decision-making power to the rule-maker, whereas standards
allocate more decision-making power to the adjudicator or
enforcer.37 Precise rules and vague standards also may have
different impacts on compliance.38 Or the two may be used

commerce would be facilitated by adopting de minimis safe harbor rules to
protect small vendors and to assure that the compliance costs do not exceed
the tax revenues at stake.”); Aaron Hsieh, Note, The Faceless Coin: Achieving
a Modern Tax Policy in the Changing Landscape of Cryptocurrency, 2019 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1079, 1094–100 (asking how the existence of de minimis tax rules
should impact the taxation of cryptocurrency).
34. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (1976) (“[T]he choice between
standards and rules of different degrees of generality is significant, and can be
analyzed in isolation from the substantive issues that the rules or standards
respond to.”).
35. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992).
36. See id. at 621–22 (“The central factor influencing the desirability of
rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will govern conduct.”).
37. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 159 (1991); Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 93 (2000) (“Rules thus
require more information and decisional competence ex ante, at the time the
rule formulators decide what the content of the rule should be. Standards
require more information and decisional competence ex post, at the time of
application.”).
38. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983) (stating that rate of compliance is one of the “principal
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together, with background standards, such as anti-abuse
standards, reducing the need for rules to be more complex to
address uncommon transactions.39 Some scholars have sought
to move beyond the rules/standards dichotomy entirely,
exploring how many hybrid forms of legal commands play an
important role in the legal system.40
Just like rules, standards, and other rule/standard hybrids,
de minimis rules are one way to fit an underlying legal command
to particular situations. As already described, de minimis rules
fill this function throughout the tax system by excepting out
insignificant taxpayers or transactions from rules of general
applicability. In this way, de minimis tax rules can be seen as a
sort of rulification of exceptions that could otherwise take more
ad hoc, or less tailored, forms.
The fact that de minimis tax rules overlap with other
possibilities may help explain why scholars have not focused on
de minimis tax rules in particular. As one possibility, in lieu of
an official de minimis tax rule, the government may reach a
similar result through nonenforcement of the law in
circumstances it deems to be de minimis.41 For example, there
is no de minimis rule that says small cash prizes do not need to
be reported as income. However, it seems unlikely that the IRS
would pursue and penalize someone who didn’t report a prize of,
say, $50.
Other formally adopted rules, like safe harbors, look similar
to de minimis rules in other ways. A safe harbor is a
rule/standard hybrid that provides “safety” to taxpayers who fit
within its boundaries, without deciding the law for taxpayers

subcategories of potential costs and benefits” of the degree of care with which
a rule is articulated).
39. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860,
870–72 (1999) (explaining the means by which standards and rules can be used
simultaneously to avoid unnecessary complexity).
40. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 165, 165 (2015) (exploring the law’s use of catalogs).
41. For a discussion of nonenforcement as a tax law tool, see generally
Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73
(2015).
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who do not.42 Like nonenforcement, safe harbors have some
similarities to de minimis rules because they may apply to small
transactions.43 However, safe harbors are distinct from de
minimis rules because their principal function is providing
certainty regarding how ambiguous law will apply in certain
circumstances, not exempting transactions from generally
applicable law on the basis of relative insignificance.44 For
example, under one safe harbor, taxpayers who pay quarterly
estimated taxes equal to 100 percent of their prior year’s tax
liability can be assured they will not owe late payment penalties
if they owe additional tax with their tax return, regardless of
how much additional tax they owe.45
Recently, tax scholarship has abstracted away from
particular design tools, in order to consider how the law, in
many ways, may except certain parties. For instance, recent
scholarship has emphasized that there are many forms of
informal leeway that result in nonapplication of the law, and
has discussed how data is likely to affect all of these forms of
leeway.46 Other important work is focusing broadly on the
problem of IRS inaction and its deregulatory consequences.47
This work, which analyzes the many offramps to the application
of the tax law, helps conceptualize the extent to which the
general tax law actually applies, to whom, and under what
circumstances.48

42. See Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1385, 1387, 1391 (2016); Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors in Tax Law, 47
CONN. L. REV. 1385, 1387–88 (2015).
43. See Morse, supra note 42, at 1402 (providing an example of a safe
harbor applying to a “cup-of-coffee” worth less than ten dollars).
44. See Cauble, supra note 42, at 1399 (“A safe harbor reduces risk and
ambiguity for taxpayers who operate within the safe harbor’s parameters.”).
45. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1)(B). Taxpayers over an income threshold must
pay 110 percent of their prior year’s tax penalty to avoid a penalty. See id.
§ 6654(d)(1)(C)(ii).
46. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Falling Short in the Digital Age 11–20
(June 12, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
47. See generally Brian Galle & Stephen Shay, Administrative Law and
the Crisis of Tax Administration (July 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
48. See id. at 2–4.
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This Article stands for the proposition that how exceptions
are created matters as well.49 The fact that there are many
potential ways to create exceptions in the law makes each tool
no less important. Rather, given the existence of other options,
the choice to use a particular tool becomes even more significant.
We believe that de minimis tax rules merit particular attention
because they both legitimize ignoring insignificant transactions
through the official sanction of a statute or regulation, while at
the same time, they appear to justify the exceptions through a
claim of insignificance. We argue that this dual facet of de
minimis tax rules: their formal entrenchment, combined with
the sense of their insignificance, has far-reaching consequences
well beyond the insignificant transactions the rules purport to
address. Essentially, the use of this widespread tax exception
tool largely flies under the radar of scholarly attention, at the
same time as its pervasiveness across the tax system yields
widespread effects.
II.

THE ROLE OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES

The notion that de minimis tax rules are insignificant is
belied by their pervasiveness across the tax law. As this Part
explores, de minimis tax rules exist in a number of different
types and serve numerous different functions, under the general
umbrella of exempting out insignificant taxpayers and
transactions. Indeed, the multiplicity and variety of de minimis
rules across the tax law suggest that, far from inconsequential
exceptions, these exceptions are, in some ways, the rule.
A.

Substantive/Procedural De Minimis Tax Rules

De minimis tax rules come in a variety of different types.
Paradigmatically, it is easiest to think of de minimis tax rules
as exempting insignificant taxpayers and transactions from the

49. Cf. Stephen E. Shay, A GILTI High-Tax Exclusion Election Would
Erode the U.S. Tax Base, 165 TAX NOTES FED. 1129, 1145 (2019) (arguing that
many important decisions, such as the role of the tax system in facilitating
income inequality, in fact arise from a series of low-salience, seemingly merely
technical decisions, like the reach of certain international tax regulations).
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burdens of the tax law.50 What we refer to as “substantive de
minimis tax rules” do this most clearly by exempting taxpayers
from substantive (and possibly procedural) tax obligations, often
if a transaction is below a certain dollar threshold or, less
commonly, if the taxpayer’s income is below a certain amount.
For example, a substantive de minimis tax rule provides that
gifts to an individual under $15,000 are not subject to gift tax or
the accompanying gift tax return obligation.51 This rule ensures
that modest giftspicture a grandparent gifting his or her
grandchild $100 at graduationdo not trigger burdensome tax
and reporting requirements on the part of the donor. If a gift
qualifies for this substantive de minimis tax rule, the taxpayer
is relieved of all tax law burdensboth procedural and
substantivethat would otherwise be associated with the gift.52
While substantive de minimis tax rules may be the norm,
there is another type of de minimis tax rule that pervades the
law as well. These rules, which we refer to as “procedural de
minimis tax rules,” relieve taxpayers only of the procedural, but
not substantive, burdens of the tax law. Consider again the $600
threshold for filing Form 1099-MISC. For a taxpayer without a
payroll administrator or an automated payroll system, filing a
1099-MISC may be time consuming and complicated. The payor
must collect tax identification and other personal information
from the payee on a Form W-9,53 and must remit the 1099 Form
at the end of the year to both the payee and the IRS.54 Even for
taxpayers with sophisticated payroll systems already in place,
50. See I.R.C. § 132 (e)(1) (defining fringe benefits as property or services
with a value “so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or
administratively impracticable”).
51. See id. § 2503 (establishing the gift exclusion, subject to inflation
adjustments); id. § 6019 (stating that gifts excluded under § 6019 are exempt
from the gift tax return requirement). The gift tax exclusion is adjusted
annually for inflation; $15,000 is the limit for 2020. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44,
2019-47 I.R.B. 1100 (stating that the amount of the annual exclusion is
$15,000 for calendar year 2020).
52. See I.R.C. § 6019(1) (exempting transfers below the annual exclusion
amount from reporting requirements).
53. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REQUESTER OF FORM
W-9 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/227W-KETP (PDF).
54. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-MISC AND
FORM 1099-NEC 4 (2020), https://perma.cc/6C49-EUFA (PDF).
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the administrative costs of gathering tax information from a
single payee for a one-off transaction might not justify the cost,
especially for low dollar, non-recurring transactions.55 The $600
de minimis threshold for Form 1099-MISC alleviates this
reporting obligation for such transactions.56 However, by
nature, such rules are not supposed to change the substantive
tax liability of the payee.57 As an example, imagine that a lawyer
pays a gardener $300 to perform a one time job, and assume the
gardener’s marginal tax rate is 20 percent. The gardener has
$300 of income and $60 of tax liability as a result of the
payment, notwithstanding the fact that the $600 de minimis
threshold relieves the lawyer of the obligation to issue a Form
1099-MISC.58 Indeed, since procedural de minimis tax rules like
this one do not purport to change the substantive tax law, they
seem like a can’t lose proposition: they reduce administrative
costs, without reducing revenue owed.59
Most other information reporting rules in the Code also
have procedural de minimis exemptions. Rules for payments
made by certain third party intermediaries are subject to an
even larger de minimis threshold than the $600 threshold for
Form 1099-MISC. Specifically, if a payment is made through an
online intermediary like PayPal, the intermediary must issue a
1099-K to the payee only when the aggregate payments to the
payee exceed both $20,000 and two hundred transactions during
the year.60 It is unclear what the justification for such a high de
minimis threshold is in the context of Form 1099-K and third
party intermediaries. It is possible that Congress did not want
to overburden online intermediaries like PayPal that facilitate
payments with large volumes of customers; the higher threshold

55. See id. at 17 (setting forth the instructions for filing form
1099-MISC).
56. I.R.C. § 6041(a).
57. However, as discussed further infra Part III.B.1, procedural de
minimis tax rules may create de facto substantive law.
58. See I.R.C. § 61 (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income
means
all
income
from
whatever
source
derived,
including . . . [c]ompensation for services . . . .”).
59. But see infra Part III.B.1, for problems presented by procedural de
minimis tax rules.
60. I.R.C. § 6050W(e).
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reduces the reporting burden. However, as discussed further
below, Congress may have failed to anticipate the scope of the
$20,000 de minimis threshold given the prevalence of
transactions that take place through online platforms.61
Other information reporting rules have much lower
procedural de minimis thresholds. For example, a Form
1099-INT is required to be issued when a payee’s interest
income is at least $10 in the aggregate.62 Similarly, a Form
1099-DIV is required whenever dividend income is at least
$10.63 These much lower thresholds appear justifiable to the
extent the payors are most likely to be financial institutions
with the scale to issue information returns on an inexpensive
basis.
Although payors are subject to penalties if they fail to file
required information returns,64 de minimis rules apply in this
context, too. Specifically, payors can avoid penalties if the
failure is corrected and if the missed or inaccurate returns do
not exceed the greater of ten information returns; or 1/2 of 1
percent of the total number of required information returns for
that year.65
Another example of procedural de minimis rules is the
substantiation
requirement
for
deducting
charitable
contributions, which requires taxpayers to obtain a written
acknowledgement from the donee organization in order to
deduct any contribution of $250 or more.66 Like with the
above-mentioned rules, this procedural de minimis rule does not
change the underlying tax law. Taxpayers can only take
charitable deductions that comply with all the requirements in
the Code.67 But this procedural de minimis rule does change who
61. See infra notes 146156 and accompanying text; see also Kathleen
DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 143637
(2018) (arguing that Congress did not contemplate the pervasiveness of
internet platform transactions when it enacted the de minimis threshold).
62. I.R.C. § 6049(a).
63. Id. § 6042(a).
64. See id. § 6721 (subjecting failures to file to “a penalty of $250 for each
return with respect to which such a failure occurs”).
65. Id. § 6721(c)(1)(2).
66. Id. § 170(f)(8).
67. See id. § 170.
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bears the burden of administrative requirements that are
designed to help the IRS enforce the substantive law embedded
in the Code.68
B.

Different Functions of De Minimis Tax Rules

Whether substantive or procedural, de minimis tax rules
serve a variety of functions, under the general umbrella function
of exempting out insignificant taxpayers and transactions. To
some extent, these exemptions are designed to reduce inordinate
costs to taxpayers. To some extent, they are designed to reduce
inordinate costs to the government. And to some extent, de
minimis tax rules seem to serve political functions that do not
seem principally motivated by cost reduction.
1.
a.

Reducing Inordinate Costs to Taxpayers

Rules That Apply to Very Low Stakes Scenarios

Some de minimis rules are designed to eliminate tax
burdens in very low stakes scenarios. For instance, the gift tax
rules allow taxpayers of any income or sophistication level to
avoid both substantive gift tax liability and the procedural
requirements of filling out a gift tax return when the transaction
is a low dollar amount.69 Several other de minimis rules work
the same way. For example, individuals who earn less than $400
in net self-employment income do not have to pay
self-employment taxes or file a Schedule SE with their tax
return.70 Nor does a homeowner who pays a household employee
less than $2,200 during the year have to report and pay
employment taxes.71 These rules generally recognize that, when
small amounts of tax revenue are at stake, the administrative
costs of reporting certain taxes are not justified. This is
particularly true for taxes that aren’t included in the ordinary
68.
69.
70.

See id. § 170(f)(8) (placing the burden on the taxpayer).
See id. § 2503.
Id. § 1402(b)(2); see Instructions for Schedule SE (2019), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc/7G83-4PXZ (last updated July 18, 2020)
(explaining when a Schedule SE must be filed).
71. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 926, HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYERS
TAX GUIDE 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/43C6-ZJ6T (PDF).
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course of preparing an individual’s income tax return. In other
words, it’s not overly burdensome to ask a taxpayer to report an
additional $50 of prize income on their tax return when they
must already file the return and report other sources of income.
But it does impose significant costs to require an individual to
file an additional schedule or a different return, and possibly
learn a different set of rules (like calculating household
employment tax).
b.

Rules that Protect Unsophisticated Parties from Complex
Tax Regimes

Another specific function of de minimis tax rules is
preventing unsophisticated taxpayers from inadvertently being
subject to a complex tax regime, such as the rules for
below-market loans. As discussed above in the example of the
mother making a small interest free loan to her adult child,
complex rules designed to prevent abuse make little sense when
applied to small, non-abusive transactions.72 Based on this
function of de minimis tax rules, we would expect to see higher
de minimis exemptions for more complex regimes. For example,
the relatively low $400 threshold for triggering a
self-employment tax obligation might reflect the idea that,
although paying self-employment tax does impose additional
administrative costs, it is not an overly complex regime. By way
of contrast, the rules for imputing interest on below-market
loans are highly complex, and a higher de minimis threshold of
$10,000 seems appropriate.
Another example of a rule that exempts small and
potentially unsophisticated taxpayers from highly complex rules
is the statutory de minimis rule found in § 199A of the Code.
Section 199A provides a deduction of up to 20 percent of the
qualified business income of certain pass-through businesses,
such as partnerships or S corporations.73 For larger businesses,
the deduction does not apply to taxpayers who work in a
“specified service trade or business” (“SSTB”), which includes
industries like law, health, accounting, and actuarial sciences,

72.
73.

See supra Part I.A.
I.R.C. § 199A(a).
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among others.74 The deduction is also limited to a percentage of
wages the taxpayer pays to employees or to a certain percentage
of depreciable property the taxpayer holds.75 However, a de
minimis rule in the statute provides that taxpayers below a
certain threshold of taxable income (adjusted annually for
inflation) can claim the deduction without regard to whether
they are in an SSTB and without regard to the wage and
depreciable property limitations.76 For 2020, the de minimis
threshold begins at $163,300 for single taxpayers and $326,600
for taxpayers who are married filing jointly.77 The effect of the
rule is to exempt “small” taxpayers (measured by income) from
the immense complexity of the 199A limitations.78 This would
mean, for example, a self-employed plumber earning $100,000
per year wouldn’t have to decide if his business was an SSTB
and wouldn’t have to calculate a limitation based on wages paid
or depreciable property. This exemption makes sense because
the amount of the deduction claimed by a lower-income taxpayer
will necessarily be modest79 and the complexity of the 199A
rules would likely impose disproportionate costs on lower
income taxpayers with lower ability to manage the complexity.
c.

Rules that Shield Both Sophisticated and Unsophisticated
Parties from Complex Tax Regimes

Other de minimis rules provide exemptions for small
transactions even when the rule might benefit sophisticated
parties. Consider, for example, the de minimis rules for
reporting original issue discount (“OID”). In general, OID arises
when a debt instrument pays more at maturity than the original

74. Id. § 199A(d).
75. Id. § 199A(b)(2).
76. Id. § 199A(b)(3)(A), (e)(2)
77. Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1099. For taxpayers over the de
minimis threshold, the deduction phases out until the taxpayer exceeds the
threshold by $50,000 ($100,000 for married filing jointly). I.R.C.
§ 199A(b)(3)(B).
78. See Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1099.
79. The deduction will generally be no more than 20 percent of the
taxpayer’s taxable income. I.R.C. § 199A(a).
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face amount of the debt.80 Whereas the gift loan scenario
typically involves parties offering interest-free loans because
they are not acting at arm’s length, the OID rules apply to
scenarios where parties may collude to defer interest income
until maturity.81 For example, an interest-free bond that was
issued for $1,000 but pays $1,200 at maturity has $200 of OID,
measured by the difference between the issue price and
maturity price. The tax laws treat the OID as interest income to
the lender (i.e., the bondholder) that must be spread out over the
term of the debt instrument.82 OID treatment is generally not
favorable because lenders must report interest income before
they have actually received the interest.83 In the preceding
example, the extra $200 payable at maturity is likely meant to
compensate the bondholder (lender) for the interest-free aspect
of the loan, but the bondholder must report the $200 in
increments as if she had received interest payments. This
results in phantom interest income, much like the below-market
loan scenario.
Like the rules for below-market loans, calculating and
reporting OID is complicated, and the Code provides de minimis
rules. First, the OID rules don’t apply to loans of $10,000 or less
made between individuals.84 Second, if the OID on any loan is
below a certain amount (which varies by the size and term of the
loan), it is treated as zero, which means it does not have to be
accrued over time as interest income.85 Instead, the lender can
report the interest at the loan’s maturity, generally as capital
gain.86
The OID de minimis thresholds function slightly differently
than the gift loan rules and the 199A de minimis threshold.
80. Id. § 1273(a)(1). Interest must be as high as the applicable Federal
rate to be considered adequate. Id. § 1274(b).
81. See id. § 1273(b)(1).
82. Id. § 1272(a)(1).
83. Id. § 1272.
84. Id. § 1272(a)(2)(D). The loan must not be a trade or business loan and
must not have a principal purpose of tax avoidance for the rule to apply. Id.
85. Id. § 1273(a)(3). The de minimis threshold is calculated as: 0.0025 x
the stated redemption price at maturity x the number of years to maturity.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2012).
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(d)(5)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2012).
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Because OID is less likely to arise in everyday transactions (like
an intra-family gift loan or earning business income as a sole
proprietor), an unsophisticated taxpayer is less likely to become
subject to the OID rules inadvertently.87 Further, even
individual investors who are deemed to receive OID will likely
receive information returns reporting it,88 and thus will not be
burdened by the complexity of calculating it (which generally
falls on the borrower/issuer89). The de minimis rules in this
context are likely aimed at exempting parties from the
complexity of calculating and reporting OID when little tax
revenue is at stake, regardless of the sophistication of the
parties. The revenue stakes are particularly relevant because
OID is largely about timing, so the tax revenue will be based on
the time value of money for modest amounts of interest.90 On
the other hand, the administrative costs of imputing interest
may be high in comparison, even for sophisticated parties.91
Other de minimis rules similarly exempt parties from tax
burdens when the tax regime is complex and the tax revenue is
small by comparison, even when the party benefitted is possibly
high income and/or sophisticated. For example, we might
assume that taxpayers who can afford vacation homes can also
afford the tax preparation assistance to properly report income
and expenses when they use the home for a mix of personal and
rental purposes. For taxpayers who split their homes between
personal use and rental use, the Code requires bifurcation of

87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.108(i)-3(a) (as amended in 2013).
88. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1099-OID 5 (2019), https://
perma.cc/RA5R-L2L8 (PDF).
89. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS 1099-INT AND
1099-OID 5 (2021), https://perma.cc/D2JD-ZCB9 (PDF).
90. See I.R.C. § 1272 (stating that gross income includes “an amount
equal to the sum of the daily portions of the original issue discount for each
day during the taxable year on which such holder held such debt instrument”).
91. Of course, the below-market loan de minimis rules may apply to
sophisticated parties, as well. We do not suggest that different de minimis
rules can neatly be placed in separate categories or do not have overlapping
functions, but rather intend this discussion simply to illustrate a range of
functions that de minimis rules serve. Also, see infra discussion accompanying
notes 176179 for a critique of OID de minimis exceptions.
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expenses according to the length of time used for each purpose.92
However, a de minimis rule in § 280A provides that for
taxpayers who rent their vacation home for less than fifteen
days during the year, the rental use can be disregarded.93 This
means that the rental income need not be reported (regardless
of amount), nor can any expenses be claimed. This allows
taxpayers who use their vacation homes primarily for personal
purposes, and who rent their homes for only a small portion of
the year, to avoid the administrative hassle of tracking expenses
that are otherwise nondeductible.
De minimis rules that allow taxpayers to deduct rather
than capitalize certain business assets similarly seek to avoid
administrative hassle in low stakes scenarios, even though the
taxpayers are often sophisticated. Capitalizing the cost of
business assets creates administrative complexity for taxpayers
because they must calculate and report annual depreciation
deductions on an asset-by-asset basis.94 Regulations under § 263
allow taxpayers to deduct the cost of certain tangible business
assets that meet a de minimis test.95 Specifically, the rule
provides that taxpayers can elect to deduct the cost of any
individual item that costs $5,000 or less.96 Taxpayers who do not
have publicly filed or independently certified financial
statements are limited to items that cost $2,500 or less.97

92. Taxpayers that use their vacation rentals for personal purposes for a
significant portion of the year can only deduct property expenses to the extent
of their rental income. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). However, taxpayers that use the
property primarily for rental income may qualify as a “business” and be able
to deduct expenses in excess of rental income. Id. § 280A(c).
93. Id. § 280A(g).
94. See id. § 168.
95. When taxpayers acquire new property for their business or for
investment purposes, § 263 of the Code generally requires them to capitalize
the cost of the property, rather than deducting it. See id. § 263.
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(f) (as amended in 2014). Certain limitations
apply; for example, the safe harbor does not apply to the purchase of inventory
or land. Id. § 1.263(a)-1(f)(2). The rule applies regardless of the aggregate cost
of such items. Id. This means a taxpayer who purchases 100 small machines
that cost $5,000 each could deduct $500,000 as a business expense.
97. Id. § 1.263(a)-1(f)(1)(ii). The regulations provide a ceiling of $500 “or
other amount as identified in published guidance,” and the IRS has raised that
ceiling to $2,500 in Notice 2015-82. See I.R.S. Notice 15-82, 2015-50 I.R.B. 859.

DE MINIMIS TAX RULES
d.

797

Rules that Benefit Sophisticated Parties in Relatively Low
Stakes Scenarios

Finally, some de minimis rules are clearly intended to
address sophisticated taxpayers who voluntarily undertake
complex transactions. In these cases, Congress (or Treasury)
may still concede that a complex or stringent rule should not be
applied to a low-stakes scenario. These rules often have more
generous de minimis thresholds, which may seem high in
isolation but aim to exempt transactions that are modest on a
relative scale. For example, a de minimis rule exists for real
estate investment trusts (“REIT”s), which allow individuals to
invest in a pool of real estate assets through a specialized
corporation.98 REITs generally are not taxed at the entity level
provided they meet specific requirements under the Code,99
including distributing most of their income to investors and
investing mostly in real estate.100 Among other stringent
investment requirements, at least 75 percent of a REIT’s assets
must be real estate, cash, or government securities;101 further,
not more than 5 percent of the REIT’s assets can be made up of
securities of one issuer and the REIT cannot own more than 10
percent of any one issuer.102 Although REITs generally must
continually meet these requirements to avoid disqualification
and an entity-level tax, the Code allows for de minimis
infractions of the 5 percent and 10 percent rules without
consequences.103 Specifically, if the value of the disqualifying
assets does not exceed the lesser of 1 percent of the REIT’s total
assets or $10 million, the REIT can correct the failure and avoid

98. I.R.C. § 856.
99. REITs are not technically pass-through entities but, rather, can
deduct all dividends paid to investors for federal income tax purposes. Id.
§ 857(b)(2)(B).
100. Id. §§ 856(c), 857(a).
101. Id. § 856(c)(4). Additionally, REITs must distribute 90 percent of their
income each year to investors, at least 75 percent of their income must come
from things like rent (and other real estate-related sources), and 95 percent of
their income must be passive investment income (e.g., interest or dividends).
Id. § 857(a)(1), (c)(3)(4).
102. Id. § 857(c)(4)(B).
103. Id. § 856(c)(7)(B).
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a penalty.104 These rules give managers some leeway for
inadvertent missteps that may be perhaps due to the changing
nature of the company’s investments.
A de minimis rule also exists under Code § 382, which
generally limits a corporation’s ability to claim net operating
losses after a change in ownership.105 For example, a profitable
corporation cannot acquire an insolvent corporation and
immediately claim all of the acquired corporation’s losses
against its operating income to avoid tax.106 The statute
provides a complex set of rules for calculating allowable losses
and gains in various circumstances after an ownership
change.107 Some of these rules involve how to treat assets with
built-in gains or losses (i.e., where the fair market value of the
asset is either greater or less than the asset’s basis).108 A de
minimis rule in § 382(h) allows built-in gain or loss to be
disregarded—treated as zerowhen the amount of built in gain
or loss is not more than the lesser of $10 million or 15 percent of
the total fair market value of the corporation’s assets.109
Although the parties who are subject to § 382 have already
taken on transaction costs and tax complexity by virtue of the
change in ownership transaction, this de minimis rule exempts
transactions that are “small” on a relative scale from some of the
more onerous and burdensome parts of the statute.
2.

Reducing Inordinate Costs to the Government

The government is also a beneficiary of de minimis tax rules
in several respects. First, the IRS clearly avoids administrative
and enforcement costs when a rule exempts small transactions,
104. Id. § 856(c)(7). The failure must be due to reasonable cause and not
willful neglect, and the disqualifying assets must be disposed of within six
months. Id. Non de minimis failures can also be cured in the six-month time
period but will subject the REIT to a financial penalty. Id.
105. See id. § 382(h)(B) (stating that losses are limited “in the same
manner as if such loss were a pre-change loss” and by the amount of “net
unrealized built-in loss, reduced by recognized built-in losses for prior taxable
years”).
106. See id. § 382(b).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 382(h).
109. Id. § 382(h)(3)(B).
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particularly if those transactions are frequent. For example, not
requiring a gift tax return every time Grandma sends a $100
check to Grandson means the IRS does not have to process
millions of extra gift tax returns each year, and does not have to
monitor whether taxpayers are complying with the rules for
reporting gifts.110 Similarly, the IRS does not have to expend
resources to audit and potentially initiate enforcement activities
against taxpayers for violations of requirements like the
requirement to report imputed interest on small below-market
loans or the requirement to report rental income on a few days
of renting a vacation home. Since relatively small de minimis
thresholds ensure only modest tax revenue is at stake, audit and
enforcement would likely be unjustified in those cases, in the
same way that taxpayer compliance costs are likely unjustified.
The same logic also applies to higher de minimis thresholds
that apply to more sophisticated transactions and parties. For
example, even though more revenue may be at stake in the
context of § 382’s de minimis rule for built in gain and loss, the
complexity of § 382 likely means more IRS enforcement costs are
also at stake, and the tradeoff of a higher de minimis threshold
may make sense.111
3.

Political Economy

Finally, some de minimis rules no doubt come about due to
rent-seeking, political pressure, or public perception about the
tax law. Such rules may be appropriately motivated by a
cost-benefit tradeoff, or they may fail to accomplish the various
roles discussed above.
One relatively benign example is the exclusion for de
minimis fringe benefits.112 As discussed above, the purpose of
the rule is to exclude small fringe benefits from income when the
administrative cost of valuing them is not worth the revenue at
stake. This cost-based justification was likely mixed with a more
political one: Congress in part enacted the rule to prevent the
110. See id. § 6019.
111. See id. § 382 (stating that the loss may not be deducted if it exceeds
“the value of the old loss corporation, multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt
rate”).
112. See id. § 132(a).
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perception that the IRS is willing to tax the small pleasures in
life.113 In other words, it may be feasible in practice for
employers to value weekly doughnuts in the breakroom and
report a small amount of additional income on their employees’
Form W-2.114 But taxing people on their free doughnuts may just
be a step too far, and may engender negative views about the
tax system and the IRS.115
Perhaps a less benign example is the “small business”
exemption from the accrual method accounting requirements.
Although individual taxpayers can elect between the cash
method and accrual method of accounting, the tax law generally
requires corporations (and certain partnerships) to report on the
accrual method.116 The accrual method is generally more
accurate but also requires more compliance costs on the part of
the taxpayer.117 Notwithstanding the general requirement that
corporations use the accrual method, a de minimis rule in § 448
allows smaller corporations to use the cash method.118 Until
recently, the de minimis threshold was $5 million in gross
receipts;119 this reflected the idea that corporations earning less
than $5 million are smaller in scale and should not have to
undergo the added complexity of accrual method accounting.
Relatedly, with fewer than $5 million in gross receipts, the tax

113. See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the
Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 91 WASH. L. REV. 761, 76263 (2016) (listing the
reasons Congress enacted § 132(a)).
114. See id. at 810 (discussing the feasibility of taxing certain fringe
benefits with modern technologies).
115. See id. at 788, 810 (discussing strong public support for not taxing
employee perks).
116. See I.R.C. § 448(a) (prohibiting C corporations, partnerships with a C
corporation partner, and tax shelters from using the cash receipts and
disbursements method of accounting in computing taxable income).
117. See Chizoba Morah, Accrual Accounting vs. Cash Basis Accounting:
What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/4D5L-TMAZ (last
updated Mar. 7, 2020).
118. I.R.C. § 448(c).
119. Colleen M. O’Connor et al., Tax Accounting for Businesses After the
TCJA: Some Widely Applicable and Lesser-Known Changes, TAX ADVISOR
(June 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/8QH8-YSJ6.
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revenue at stake would be modest.120 However, 2017 tax
reform—the so-called “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA)—raised
the de minimis threshold from $5 million to $25 million in gross
receipts.121 This means that corporations with gross receipts
under $25 million are now eligible to report on the cash method,
allowing for favorable income deferral.122 The $25 million rule
extends to other accounting rules, as well, allowing corporations
that fall under the threshold to deduct rather than capitalize
certain costs123 and to avoid less favorable accounting methods
that apply to specific situations.124 It is unclear what the
justification for such a drastic increase in the small business
threshold is, other than to provide a tax benefit to the impacted
businesses. The role of lobbying in the creation of de minimis tax
rules is discussed further in the next Part.
III. PROBLEMS WITH DE MINIMIS TAX RULES
Having surveyed the roles and functions of the de minimis
rules that pervade the tax law in the preceding Part, this Part
now turns to the potential pitfalls of de minimis tax rules. In
short, de minimis tax rules may not always accomplish the
functions described in Part II and may impose unintended costs.
These drawbacks include increased complexity in other parts of
the tax law, the tendency to take on unintended scope,
particular susceptibility to lobbying, and administrative
authority issues when such rules are created outside of the
legislative process.

120. Note that the tax is applied to net business income and that
accounting methods merely reflect the timing rather than amount of tax
reported.
121. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 115TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF
PUB. L. 115-97 (Comm. Print 2018).
122. The gross receipts test is applied over a three-year period. See I.R.C.
§ 448(c)(1).
123. See id. § 263A(i).
124. See, e.g., id. §§ 460(e)(1)(B), 471(c) (providing long-term completion
method for construction contracts and inventories, respectively).
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De Minimis Tax Rules Allow the Tax Law to be More
Complex

While one of the principal functions of de minimis tax rules
is reducing costs for taxpayers and the government, an
under-appreciated feature of such rules is that they allow the
rest of the tax law to be more complex. Specifically, by allowing
certain taxpayers to avoid application of an underlying tax rule,
de minimis rules also allow the law to be more burdensome than
it otherwise would be for the taxpayers and transactions left in
the generally applicable tax system. The intuition here is the
same intuition behind the economic theory of price
discrimination. Price discrimination involves charging different
amounts for similar goods in a way that cannot be explained
fully by differences in the marginal costs of producing the
goods.125 By charging different prices, price discrimination
allows producers to segment the market into consumers with
different willingness to pay.126 This segmentation then enables
the producer to earn more profit than if the producer were
confined to average price across the entire market.127
The analogue in the tax system is that, although not
typically described this way, the tax system has different
markets of taxpayers and transactions.128 Some taxpayers are
very sophisticated taxpayers, often advised by specialized tax
counsel, capable of understanding and responding to complex
tax rules.129 Indeed, many such taxpayers need to be subject to

125.

Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK
2221, 2224–25 (2007).
126. Id. at 2226.
127. Id. at 2224.
128. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Andrew Blair-Stanek, Contractual
Tax Reform, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1537, 1549–50 (2020) (proposing a move
beyond one-size-fits-all taxation to better accommodate diverse taxpayers);
Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 690 (2009) (imagining different tax
compliance and enforcement regimes to target different types of taxpayers);
see also Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and
the Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 242–45 (2017) (exploring the differential
impact of tax law “simplexity” on different taxpayers).
129. See, e.g., Tax Overview, FENWICK, https://perma.cc/2F4V-SD2H
(“Fenwick has achieved a reputation as having one of the nation’s leading
OF INDUS. ORG.
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complex tax rules, both to capture the complexity of the
taxpayer’s transactions and to prevent such taxpayers from
engaging in sophisticated transactions to lower their tax
liability.130 Other taxpayers have lower ability to understand
complex tax rules.131 Moreover, the latter group may engage in
simpler transactions, which may not merit application of
complex rules. These dissimilarly situated taxpayers can be
thought of as different segments of the taxpayer market.132
De minimis rules help differentiate complexity across the
taxpayer market. For instance, the $10,000 de minimis
threshold for below-market loans not only exempts relatively
insignificant taxpayers or transactions from the complex
below-market loan rules, but also helps enable these
non-intuitive and complex rules to remain in the Code for
others. Put another way, de minimis tax rules help avoid the
extreme alternatives of applying complex rules to all taxpayers
or eliminating those rules entirely.
While this very feature of de minimis tax rules can serve as
an underappreciated benefit in some circumstances, such rules
may inadvertently preserve or encourage too much tax law
complexity in others. For instance, the rules regarding the 199A
deduction have been decried as inordinately complex and, in
domestic and international tax practices [which] stems from its client base
[including] over 100 Fortune 500 companies.”).
130. See Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV.
549, 573 (2016) (“Sophisticated targets often view the law as a tool rather than
an imperative, and they may hire specialized experts to plan and structure
their activities.”).
131. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: The
California ReadyReturn, 107 TAX NOTES 1431, 1431 (2005) (explaining how
even basic tax return requirements outpace many taxpayers’ reading levels).
132. The dichotomy described in taxpayer markets in the text is stylized
rather than an accurate portrayal of what is a complicated set of
circumstances. For instance, many taxpayers with relatively straightforward
tax situations nonetheless engage in behavior to unjustifiably reduce their tax
liability. This is quite common with cash business taxpayers. See, e.g., Susan
Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 37, 38 (2009) (providing a foundational account of cash business tax
evasion). The idea here is not that all sophisticated taxpayers create
compliance problems whereas all less sophisticated taxpayers do not, or that
there is even an uncontroversial understanding of what it means to be a
sophisticated taxpayer. Rather, the idea is that there are clearly different
markets of taxpayers that the tax law ideally needs to treat differently.
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some ways, fundamentally nonsensical.133 While the de minimis
threshold in § 199A blunts these costs for lower income
taxpayers,134 it is not clear that blunting such costs is actually a
desirable outcome, if it helped preserve seemingly nonsensical
complexity for others, and avoided wholesale rethinking of the
rules.
Another, related point is that de minimis tax rules have
important, underappreciated distributive consequences. When a
particular constituency gains the benefit of a de minimis tax
rule, that constituency is clearly subject to a lower tax burden
than otherwise would have applied. But, by getting a de minimis
tax rule in the law, the constituency also enables tax law
drafters to make the generally applicable tax law more
burdensome than it otherwise would have been. The
constituency that gains the benefit of a de minimis tax rule thus
has not only won for itself. In some ways, it has also ensured
that other taxpayers and transactions will lose. Here, too, lack
of attention to de minimis tax rules has obscured hidden costs
that the rules impose on at least some taxpayers, and a careful
consideration of when the benefits of the rules are worth the
costs.
B.

De Minimis Tax Rules May Take on an Unintended Scope

De minimis tax rules impose unintended consequences that
that go beyond preserving or even increasing the complexity of
the general tax law. De minimis tax rules often take on an
unintended scope, including creating de facto substantive rules
when only procedural rules were intended, and locking in
permanent fixes when a temporary and/or flexible approach is
in order.

133. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through
Rules, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 49, 56–59 (harshly critiquing the 199A deduction
and the lack of clear justification for it).
134. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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Procedural Rules May Create De Facto Substantive Law

As discussed previously, procedural de minimis rules
pervade the tax law.135 Although these rules do not purport to
alter substantive tax obligations, in practice they do so.
Consider again the $600 threshold for 1099-MISC reporting.
Technically, this is a procedural de minimis tax rule that does
not purport to change a contractor’s obligation to report service
income. But in practice, the de minimis rule heavily impacts
how much income gets reported.
Whereas the vast majority of income reported on a Form
1099 is reported accurately to the IRS, income that is not subject
to third-party information reporting is far less likely to be
reported by the recipient.136 Returning to the example of a
lawyer paying a gardener $300 for a one-off service with no
Form 1099 obligation, there is a high probability that the
gardener will not report the $300 of income, even though the tax
law is clear that payments to contractors of any size are
taxable.137 There are several possible explanations for this.
Without information from a third party (like the lawyer), the
IRS is unlikely to discover the gardener’s income.138 Thus, the
gardener may knowingly fail to report it on his return,
understanding that his odds of getting caught and penalized are
extremely low.139 Second, it is possible that at least some
taxpayers will fail to keep good records of their income, and
without a Form 1099 as a reminder, forget to report it. Finally,
and most critically with respect to the use of procedural de
minimis tax rules, the $600 de minimis threshold may send a
false signal to taxpayers that there is no legal obligation to
135. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
136. See BARRY W. JOHNSON ET AL., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 1415
(REV. 9-2019), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR
TAX YEARS 2011–2013 at 13 (2019).
137. See I.R.C. § 61.
138. An individual taxpayer’s chance of being audited is less than 1
percent. Compliance Presence, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc
/MU76-QHRQ (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
139. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the
Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1733, 1738–39 (2010) (describing the deterrence function of information
reporting).
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report income for which there is no Form 1099.140 In other
words, the procedural de minimis tax rule may unintentionally
lead the gardener to falsely believe that income under $600 is
not reportable at all.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that procedural de minimis tax
rules do, indeed, tend to confuse taxpayers, making them believe
that what is really only a procedural de minimis threshold in
fact changes substantive tax law. Tax advisors report online
that a “myth that refuses to die more than any other” is that
payments under $600 are not subject to tax liability,”141 and that
“[i]t is commonly believed that you do not have to report your
earnings unless they meet or exceed $600.”142 Other online
advisors try to explain that tax liability is still owed for
payments below the threshold amount, even though the
procedural de minimis exception “can make things a little
confusing for the taxpayer . . . since logic can easily lead you to
conclude that you don’t have to file taxes if you don’t receive a
form.”143 Still other websites catalog taxpayers wrestling with
the question and expressing confusion about whether they have
to pay tax on less than $600.144
Viewed in this context, the $600 threshold for reporting
independent contractor income has changed perceptions of the
law in a way that exceeds the intended impacts on procedure
only. Indeed, to the extent that the procedural de minimis
threshold changes perceptions of the law, it expands well beyond
procedure into the realm of substantive tax collection. For those

140. See, e.g., Kelly Phillips Erb, Ask the Taxgirl: Reporting Income Under
$600, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:28 PM), https://perma.cc/A69K-EWDL
(explaining that only a $600 and above payment triggers the issuance of a
federal form 1099, but it does not mean that taxpayers are permitted to
exclude income payments less than $600 from their taxes).
141. Have You Fallen for the $600 Tax Reporting Myth?, ARTISTIC
CONSPIRACY, https://perma.cc/TBD9-CXDM.
142. Do You Have to Report Freelance Income if You Make Less Than $600
a Year?, CHRON, https://perma.cc/AGC4-XUDD (last updated Sept. 10, 2020).
143. Stephanie Faris, Do I Have to Report Earnings Under $600?, ZACKS,
https://perma.cc/S2WP-B6DP (last updated Mar. 9, 2019).
144. See, e.g., If I Had a Job that I Made Less Than $600 Do I Have to
Claim That?, INTUIT TURBO: REAL MONEY TALK (June 7, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://
perma.cc/5TWN-NYGG.
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taxpayers who do not pay tax on their income, it has facilitated
a de facto, substantive tax law exemption.
A de facto exemption for income under $600 may not be
undesirable, at least at first glance. Given the low amount of tax
revenue at stake for a one-off transaction under $600, the
compliance costs on the part of the taxpayer and enforcement
costs on the part of the IRS may not be justified. But this
assumes that unreported transactions happen infrequently for
each taxpayer, which is not necessarily the case. Consider again
a gardener who is paid $300 by a lawyer for removing a tree.
Assume the gardener’s business primarily consists of one-time
tree removal transactions, and that he conducts 300 of such
transactions a year, all of which cost $300. Suddenly, the
revenue at stake is much higher (the tax on $90,000 of income
in this example). Yet, if each transaction involves a different
payor, the gardener will not receive any 1099s. If the gardener
views the de minimis threshold on 1099 reporting as a
substantive tax exemption, his tax liability will have changed
significantly, with attendant consequences on the fairness and
efficiency of the tax system overall.
It is also not clear that Congress, in enacting procedural de
minimis tax rules, intends to create de facto substantive tax
exemptions. Indeed, if Congress did think that income below a
certain threshold amount should not be taxed, it would be more
straightforward for Congress to explicitly say so (along with
ancillary changes to any reporting requirements). Doing so
would create a more transparent sense of how much revenue the
government can expect to raise, and, critically, would make
actual expectations about tax liability more transparent to
taxpayers. The fact that Congress has not created substantive
exemptions should thus be read as an indication that Congress
did not intend to make them. This means that procedural de
minimis tax rules are creating de facto substantive exemptions
inconsistent with Congress’s intentions for the tax law.
A de facto tax exemption is problematic for other reasons,
as well. Some gardeners will underreport income when they
don’t receive a Form 1099, but others will report honestly,
violating horizontal equity between taxpayers. A widespread
practice of not reporting income under the $600 threshold may
also perpetuate confusion about the rules among taxpayers or
resentment
from
honest
taxpayers.
Finally,
broad
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noncompliance in certain sectors may distort the market by
encouraging oversupply of de facto “tax-exempt” jobs (like
gardeners, in this example).145
The rules for reporting on Form 1099-K provide a relatively
recent illustration of these problems. The Form 1099-K rules
were enacted in 2008 to require information reporting by credit
card companies and other financial intermediaries.146 As
discussed in Part II, for certain parties, the threshold for issuing
a Form 1099-K is $20,000 and two hundred transactions.147
These rules generally apply to payments made through online
intermediaries.148 Consider, for example, an internet platform
like Airbnb. Renters who rent homes on the platform remit
payment to Airbnb, the online intermediary.149 Airbnb collects a
fee and remits the remainder of the renter’s payment to the
owner; the owner, in turn, is obligated to report the payment as
rental income.150 Because the transaction takes place through
Airbnb (an online intermediary) and not directly between two
parties (as in the gardener-lawyer example), the Form 1099-K
rules apply rather than the Form 1099-MISC rules.151 Those
145. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the
Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 506–08 (2007) (“To the extent workers and
investors experience disutility in underreporting, there will be less
tax-induced movement to the cash sector and lower welfare costs. We know
that underreporting is the norm in the cash sector.”).
146. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., TECH. EXPLANATION OF
DIV. C OF H.R. 3221, THE “HOUSING ASSISTANCE TAX ACT OF 2008” AS
SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY H.R. ON JULY 23, 2008, at 60–61 (Comm.
Print 2008) (discussing the purpose of § 6050W to require credit card
information reporting).
147. See I.R.C. § 6050W(e).
148. See id. § 6050W(a), (b)(3); see also Third Party Network Transactions
FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://perma.cc/T8PL-YT3P (last updated
Aug. 17, 2020) (outlining the characteristics of third-party settlement
organizations and citing the most common example as an “online
auction-payment facilitator”).
149. See Why Should I Pay and Communicate Through Airbnb Directly?,
AIRBNB, https://perma.cc/3P58-Z8JF.
150. See What Are Airbnb Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://perma.cc/K8XK7DVK.
151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv) (2010) (“Transactions that are
described in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section [third-party network
transactions] that otherwise would be subject to reporting under both sections
6041 and 6050W are reported under section 6050W and not section 6041.”).
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rules require Airbnb to issue a Form 1099-K to the owner only
if Airbnb facilitated payments exceeding $20,000 for that owner
and over two hundred payment transactions took place.152 The
threshold is, of course, much higher than the $600 threshold
that applies to the gardener.
The much higher 1099-K threshold arguably applies to all
sorts of gig economy transactions that take place through online
platforms.153 In another work, one of us argued that Congress
did not contemplate the pervasiveness of internet platform
transactions when it enacted the de minimis threshold and that
the threshold should be made much lower.154 In the meantime,
we can expect the same de facto income exemption to exist in
this context as in the Form 1099-MISC context. In other words,
there is a high likelihood that people earning under $20,000
from internet platforms will not report their income. The much
larger Form 1099-K threshold makes this de facto exemption
significantly more problematic. Not only are higher dollar
amounts at stake, but the $20,000 threshold expands the reach
of the de facto exemption significantly. For example, one study
of gig economy workers showed that the majority of such
workers do not earn more than $10,000 per year.155 This
potentially means that a significant number of gig economy
workers do not receive 1099s, and many likely fail to report their
gig income accurately.156

152. See I.R.C. § 6050W(e).
153. “Arguably” because the application of the Form 1099-K threshold to
gig economy platforms has been debated, and some platforms (e.g., Uber) have
taken the position that they will use the $600 threshold. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei
& Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1034–38
(2016).
154. See Thomas, supra note 61, at 1436–37 (suggesting that
developments in technology and tax enforcement should prompt a revision in
how the gig economy is taxed).
155. See DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST.,
PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY 24 (2016), https://
perma.cc/4UUN-HW3S (PDF) (finding that the “Online Platform Economy”
was a secondary source of income for the average participant, and the vast
majority relied on it for only 25 percent of their income).
156. See Thomas, supra note 61, at 1428.
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Finally, consider again the $250 threshold for
substantiating charitable contributions.157 Although the $250
threshold does not impact the deductibility of charitable
contributions, in practice, this threshold may function like the
Form 1099 rules. In other words, because taxpayers are not
required to substantiate charitable contributions to a particular
donee under $250, we can expect to see more noncompliance
under the threshold, based in part on mistaken taxpayer beliefs
about the impact of the substantiation threshold. Whereas Form
1099 noncompliance looks like non-reporting of income,
noncompliance in this context might mean claiming deductions
for donations that were not made or that were not made to
qualifying tax-exempt organizations.
2.

Lock-In of a Temporary Solution

De minimis tax rules may also create permanent fixes to
problems that continue to evolve over time. By virtue of being
statutory or regulatory rules, de minimis tax rules are
inherently “sticky” compared to alternatives like an
administrative nonenforcement policy. This stickiness can
prevent administrative solutions from evolving over time to
match the underlying problem.
One context in which this problem arises is when Congress
fails to index de minimis tax rules. To be sure, some de minimis
tax rules, like the statutory income threshold in § 199A, are
adjusted annually for inflation.158 But many de minimis tax
rules are not indexed. Consider the $600 threshold for issuing
Form 1099-MISC, which has been in place without adjustment
since 1954.159 Based on inflation alone, the threshold requires
information reporting for much smaller transactions today than
it did previously, which may not make sense from a compliance
cost perspective.160 But failing to index the threshold has also
157.
158.
159.
OF THE

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41400, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENHANCED FORM 1099 INFORMATION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 10

(2011).
160. For example, a $600 payment in May of 1954 would be equivalent to
a $5,719 payment in May of 2020. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., https://perma.cc/7GVQ-LSZJ. On the other hand, technological
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made it significantly harder for Congress to implement sensible
expansions to the scope of the Form 1099-MISC requirement.
The current 1099-MISC rule contains numerous exceptions.
For instance, the reporting requirement only applies to
payments by persons engaged in a trade or business and does
not apply to payments for goods (rather than services).161 In
2010 and 2011, as part of healthcare reform legislation,
Congress expanded the reporting requirement in various ways,
including by applying it to payments for goods and rent
payments even if the lessor was not in the “trade or business” of
renting property.162 This set off a rallying cry of opposition, with
opponents arguing that these increased reporting requirements
hurt small businesses and unsophisticated taxpayers.163 This
opposition was successful, and the increased reporting
requirements were repealed.164
This repeal occurred in part because the relatively low de
minimis threshold of $600 enabled opposition to argue
convincingly that the new reporting requirements were too
burdensome for taxpayers, such as small businesses.165 A higher
de minimis threshold would have made it harder to attack the
law as too burdensome for small businesses and other similarly
situated taxpayers.166 Indeed, one Congressional Research
Service analyst explored raising the threshold amount,

advances have likely made the cost of information reporting significantly
cheaper than it was in the 1950s, in which case a lower threshold in today’s
dollars may make sense.
161. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 2.
162. Id. at 1.
163. See, e.g., Robb Mandelbaum, Why the New 1099 Rules Aren’t that Bad
for Small Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc
/LX5V-6HW9 (asserting that “nobody in Washington” has anything good to say
about the increased reporting requirements).
164. See Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of
Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, I.R.C. § 6041.
165. See, e.g., KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 6 (explaining concern over
small businesses and low exemption amount as main source of opposition).
166. Raising the threshold amount to $5,000 and adding an additional de
minimis exemption for small business with twenty-five or fewer employees
was explicitly considered in response to small business gripes about the
burdens of the new reporting requirements. 156 CONG. REC. S7,053 (daily ed.
Sept. 14, 2010) (statement of Sen. Bill Nelson).
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explaining, “A higher threshold would ease the burden many
small businesses claim the new requirements impose, since it
would presumably reduce the number of transactions that
require a 1099-MISC to be completed.”167 The role that a higher
threshold could have played illustrates the more general
phenomenon: the ability to revisit de minimis rules over time
can blunt criticisms that the generally applicable law is too
burdensome for certain constituencies. But the very
promulgation of a de minimis rule in the form of a statute or
regulations can tend to preclude such re-visitation in a way that
makes it harder to change the generally applicable law.
The de minimis fringe benefits rule under § 132 provides
another illustration of this administrative lock-in problem.
When the IRS first recognized an exclusion for de minimis fringe
benefits in the 1950s, it referred to “the value of a turkey, ham,
or other item of merchandise of similar nominal value,
distributed by an employer to an employee at Christmas, or a
comparable holiday.”168 Congress codified this result when it
enacted § 132 in 1984, and regulations cite occasional cocktail
parties, holiday gifts, coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks as
examples of de minimis fringes.169 But the landscape of fringe
benefits in 2020 looks vastly different than it did in the
twentieth century.170 Today, companies (often technology
companies in Silicon Valley) offer a vast array of workplace
perks that range from onsite haircuts, yoga classes, gourmet
cafeterias, to laundry.171 It appears many of these benefits go
unreported, arguably, because they are hard to value and thus
may be considered tax-free de minimis fringes.172 But in the
aggregate, such benefits far exceed the value of an occasional
cocktail party or ham, and Congress clearly did not contemplate
the compensation regimes we see today.173

167. KEIGHTLEY, supra note 159, at 10.
168. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1984).
170. See generally Soled & Thomas, supra note 114 (exploring the “fringe
benefit evolution” that has occurred over the last seventy years).
171. Id. at 779.
172. Id. at 814.
173. Id. at 765, 813.
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In its current form, § 132 is ill-equipped to handle the
taxation of many modern-day fringe benefits. The result is
confusion about the state of the tax law, inequities in terms of
who benefits from the rule, and potential revenue loss and
inefficiencies from the nonreporting of many fringe benefits.174
The upside of codifying the exclusion for de minimis fringes (and
other fringe benefits) in 1984 was that it provided clarity for
taxpayers at that time.175 But with new, uncontemplated
benefits recently emerging, the static nature of the statute
reveals drawbacks.
Likewise, the de minimis rules for OID made more sense
when enacted as a way protect taxpayers from the complexity of
calculating hidden interest on small loans or on small hidden
interest amounts.176 Calculating original issue discount as it
accrues ratably over the life of a debt instrument requires
advanced mathematical tools and thus, without the use of
sophisticated computational tools, can be quite burdensome.177
Congress was cognizant of such burdens, especially as it
significantly expanded the scope of the OID rules to cover a
larger and larger swath of transactions over several decades.178
As a result, in 1984, when Congress extended application of the
rules, Congress added the de minimis rules to ensure that the
complexities would not “apply to most routine transactions of
individual taxpayers, or to de minimis transactions of

174. Id. at 814–15.
175. Id. at 769–70.
176. See supra notes 80–91 and accompanying text (discussing OID rules
and de minimis exceptions).
177. See Jaime Cuevas Dermody & R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, Mathematics of
Debt Instrument Taxation, reprinted in 3 FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS &
INSTRUMENTS 4 (1994) (exploring the mathematics of debt instruments, as
applicable to original issue discount, market discount, and other tax
principles).
178. Codification of the ratable accrual rules occurred as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 91ST CONG., SUMMARY
OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 60–61 (Comm. Print)
(describing the issue). The IRS successfully argued for treatment of hidden
interest as interest (albeit not ratably accrued) prior to this time. See United
States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 61–65 (1965).
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individuals or others.”179 While this may have made sense in
1984, the advent of sophisticated computerized computational
tools since that time has made the actual calculation
significantly less burdensome. And yet, the de minimis
threshold enacted as part of the statute continues to exempt
small loans and hidden interest, arguably creating a much less
justifiable giveaway for many transactions.
To be sure, this problem is not unique to de minimis tax
rules or even to the tax law; legislation tends to be sticky180 and
that stickiness can impose costs. In the criminal law context, for
instance, scholars have lamented outdated criminalization of
offenses such as adultery, fornication, sodomy, and railroad
trespass.181 In some ways the problem of outdating is similar,
but exacerbated, in the context of de minimis tax rules. This is
not to say that attitudes cannot change rapidly regarding
criminalized offenses. Rather, the claim is that, inherently,
what is deemed “insignificant” from an administrative point of
view is likely to change more rapidly over time than shifting
mores regarding crimes like adultery. In any event, lock-in
matters in both cases.
More significantly, the inflexibility of de minimis tax rules
is particularly problematic because de minimis rules are
intended to resolve administrative problems. But they do so by
locking in forbearance from the generally applicable approach.
In so doing, de minimis rules undermine the very administrative
flexibility they are designed to promote. Police, prosecutors, and
judges, for instance, can simply fail to enforce outdated criminal
laws (though they will not always do so, and there may be
questions about whether nonenforcement is the best way to
achieve removal of such laws from practice).182 But tax law
179.
OF THE

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm.

Print).
180. Jason Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L.
REV. 1055, 1067 (2015).
181. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV.
223, 229 (2007).
182. There is a large and growing literature on administrative
forbearance, in particular in the criminal law context. See, e.g., Roger Fairfax,
Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244–46 (2011)
(analyzing generally the phenomenon of prosecutorial nullification); W. Kerrel
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administrators are more hamstrung by de minimis tax rules
that actually dictate the administrative practices they have to
take and, more problematically, those they are no longer
entitled to take. The Code, for instance, tells taxpayers that de
minimis OID simply does not constitute OID.183 As a result, it
need not be reported on information returns, or to the IRS, or
considered at all in the calculation of OID.184 The enactment of
this rule, meant to alleviate undue administrative burdens, thus
actually precludes the IRS, the tax administrator, from
adjusting when such administrative burdens change. The more
general lesson is that lock-in, a problem that is inherent to the
creation of formal law, may be particularly problematic when
administrative forbearance is the point, as with de minimis tax
rules, rather than a potential solution to the lock-in effect, as is
the case with criminal law.
C.

De Minimis Tax Rules Are Particularly Susceptible to
Rent-Seeking that Benefits Insiders

Aside from being inflexible, de minimis tax rules are also
particularly susceptible to the type of problematic rent-seeking
that can disproportionately benefit insiders. While tax
scholarship has not paid particular attention to the phenomenon
of de minimis tax rules, industry insiders know well the value
such rules can confer. Indeed, the fact that de minimis tax rules
may fly beneath the radar as seemingly insignificant makes
them particularly valuable to knowledgeable insiders. This is
evident from the regulatory process that followed the recent
enactment of the TCJA.185 The legislation itself was passed
through Congress extraordinarily quickly, leaving many

Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (exploring state prosecutors’ categorical nonenforcement); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1551 (1981) (critiquing vastness of prosecutorial discretion).
183. See I.R.C. § 1273(a)(3) (“If the [OID] is less than 1/4th of 1 percent of
the stated redemption price at maturity, multiplied by the number of complete
years to maturity, then the [OID] shall be treated as zero.”).
184. Id.
185. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
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uncertainties and downright mistakes that needed to be ironed
out in the regulatory process.186
One of the principal areas of regulatory action focused on
§ 199A and what would constitute a “specified service trade or
business” (“SSTB”) which, under the statute, will not produce
the valuable qualified business income deduction.187 Great
uncertainty as to what would constitute SSTBs created
particularly robust lobbying opportunities in the regulatory
process.188
Industries ultimately won some major victories about the
definition of SSTBs in the regulatory process. For instance, in a
heavily watched and much discussed win for the banking
industry, Treasury concluded that “financial services” does not
include “taking deposits or making loans.”189 As a result,
engaging in such activities would not make banks ineligible for
the deduction.
Alongside these major definitional decisions was another,
less salient, but arguably no less important regulatory decision:
Treasury offered a de minimis rule for SSTBs. Under this de
minimis rule, if a business has gross receipts of $25 million or
less, the business will not be considered an SSTB if less than 10
percent of the business’s gross receipts are attributable to the
performance of services that constitute an SSTB.190 If a business
has gross receipts in excess of $25 million, then the de minimis
rule uses a 5, rather than 10 percent, threshold.191
The statute itself did not seem to call for or contemplate
such a de minimis rule. Nonetheless, in offering the de minimis
rule, Treasury explained that,
Although the statute, read literally, does not suggest that a
certain quantum of specified service activity is necessary to
186. See, e.g., Oei & Osofsky, supra note 9, at 256.
187. I.R.C. § 199A(d) (providing that “qualified trade or business” does not
include “specified service trade or business” and defining “specified service
trade or business”). A statutory de minimis rule allows taxpayers with income
below threshold amounts to qualify for the deduction even if the business is an
SSTB, as discussed in supra Part II.B.1.
188. Oei & Osofsky, supra note 9, at 217–20.
189. Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(xiv) (as amended in 2019).
190. Id. § 1.199A-5(c)(1)(i).
191. Id. § 1.199A-5(c)(1)(ii).
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find an SSTB, the Treasury Department and the IRS believe
that requiring all taxpayers to evaluate and quantify any
amount of specified service activity would create
administrative complexity and undue burdens for both
taxpayers and the IRS. Therefore . . . it is appropriate to
provide a de minimis rule, under which a trade or business
will not be considered to be an SSTB merely because it
provides a small amount of services in a specified service
activity.192

With this explanation, Treasury offered a de minimis rule,
seemingly out of whole cloth, for the stated purpose of
eliminating “administrative complexity and undue burdens.”193
While Treasury presented the de minimis rule as in some
ways a rounding error for “small amount[s] of services,” the
reality was that this de minimis rule has substantial impacts on
tax burdens. Take, for instance, a business with gross receipts
of $100 million. Imagine that 4.5 percent of the business’s gross
receipts are attributable to the performance of services that
would clearly constitute an SSTB under the statute (such as, for
instance, the performance of “financial services”).194 As a result
of the de minimis rule, the entire $100 million of the business’s
gross income would remain eligible for the qualified business
income deduction.195 Under the statute, however, it is not clear
this is the right result.196 Indeed, one possibility under the
statute (ultimately rejected by the de minimis rule), could have
been that, to the extent the business engages in any activities
that constitute an SSTB, the business would not be eligible for
any qualified business income deduction. The facts of this
example reveal the potentially extreme consequences of the
different choices. In this case, the de minimis rule results in

192. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Qualified Business Income Deduction,
REG-107892-18, at 51, https://perma.cc/4PS2-7AJR (PDF).
193. Id.
194. I.R.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A) (as incorporated by reference and altered by
I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2)(A)).
195. The calculation of what income is actually eligible for the qualified
business income deduction is quite complicated and is not a straight deduction
from gross income. See id. § 199A(a)–(c).
196. No de minimis exception is mentioned or specifically contemplated in
the statute’s definition of SSTB. See id. § 199(d)(2) (defining SSTB).
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$100 million of the business’s gross income being eligible for the
deduction, relative to an alternative in which the business is
entirely disqualified from the deduction!197 Multiplied across
taxpayers, the de minimis rule, rather than a mere rounding
error, has huge revenue and allocative implications.
Industry insiders inherently understood the value of the de
minimis rule, repeatedly engaging with it in the regulatory
process. For instance, the most common comment submitted
during the regulation’s notice-and-comment process was a form
letter by S corporation banks asking for beneficial treatment
under the SSTB rules.198 These letters asked for two things: a
more favorable definition of which banking activities should be
excluded from the SSTB definition and a more favorable de
minimis rule.199 Of the two, the letters focused more on the de
minimis rule.200 With respect to the de minimis rule, the form
letter argued, among other things, that “[t]he proposed rule’s de
minimum thresholds for revenues derived from specified service
trades or businesses (SSTBs) are unreasonably low and will trip
up hundreds of community banks in their ability to use the tax
relief as intended as intended [sic] by Congress.”201 As detailed
by Treasury in the preamble to the final regulations,
commentators also made many more specific requests about the
de minimis rule in the notice-and-comment process.202
The fact that the de minimis rule conferred a substantial
benefit on taxpayers, in some cases equal to or greater than
major definitional decisions is not to say that it was unjustified.
But the lack of a framework around de minimis tax rules meant
there was little basis for making such an evaluation. There were
also fundamental, unanswered questions about whether the de
minimis rule could be justified at all, at least based on the
197. Another, middle-ground possibility could have been disallowance only
to the extent of SSTB activity.
198. See, e.g., Kenan Warren, Comment Letter on Proposed Qualified
Business Income Deduction (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/EX9P-23LQ
(providing one example of many form letters submitted as a comment).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Qualified Business Income Deduction, 84 Fed. Reg. 2952-01, 2975–76
(Feb. 8, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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proffered reasons offered by Treasury. If the point of the de
minimis rule was to alleviate “administrative complexity and
undue burdens for both taxpayers and the IRS,” would the de
minimis rule, as crafted, accomplish that goal? Wouldn’t it be
the case that, as drafted, the de minimis rule would actually
make it more important for taxpayers to keep track of small
amounts of SSTB activity to ensure they were below the de
minimis threshold?203 The fact that de minimis rules are often
subject to little searching review likely helped avoid careful
consideration of such questions and ensure a big industry win.
D.

The Administrative Authority for Non-Statutory De
Minimis Rules is Uncertain

The prevalence of de minimis rules in the tax regulatory
process raises a final issue. Congress, by virtue of its legislative
power,204 certainly has the authority to make de minimis rules
in tax statutes. But what about the many de minimis rules
contained in tax regulations? Does Treasury have the authority
to make them? As this Part illustrates, Treasury is actually on
shaky ground in promulgating these rules. There are a number
of canons of statutory interpretation which, while not
conclusively, suggest limits on the ability of Treasury or courts
to create de minimis tax rules. Judicial authority about the role
of Congress, the agency, and courts sheds even more doubt on
Treasury’s de minimis authority. Thus, even though de minimis
tax rules may play an important role in the tax law, it may be
incumbent on Congress to play the dominant role in making
them.
1.

Statutory Interpretation

Congress can make de minimis tax rules and does, indeed,
make them. Even when Congress does not itself supply a de
203. At least one commentator raised this as an issue in a public hearing
about the regulations. Public Hearing on Proposed Regulations: ‘Qualified
Business Deduction,’ United States Department of Treasury, TAXNOTES Doc.
2018-41216, Oct. 16, 2018, at 28 (“If everyone out there has to run through the
De Minimis test then it appears to be contrary to some of the announced
purposes of the guidance in the preamble.”) (on file with author).
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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minimis tax rule, Congress sometimes explicitly asks Treasury
to do so. For instance, in setting out the rules regarding
employee retirement plans, Congress declared that, “[t]he
Secretary shall by regulations provide that this subparagraph
shall not apply to any plan amendment . . . unless such
amendment adversely affects the rights of any participant in a
more than de minimis manner.”205
These and other examples beg the question: does the fact
that Congress explicitly provides or requests de minimis tax
rules in some cases indicate an intent not to have them in
others? A number of canons of construction would suggest as
much. Canons are interpretive presumptions regarding the
meaning of statutes. A number of canons could support an
inference that Congress’s explicit provision of or request for de
minimis tax rules in some places indicates Congress’s intent (or
at least assumption) that they will not exist in others.
For instance, courts often apply a “rule against
superfluities,” under which no part of the statute is deemed
“superfluous, void or insignificant.”206 Applying this rule,
Congress’s explicit request in some places for Treasury to create
a de minimis rule may be superfluous if Treasury always has
this authority. Likewise, another canon of construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, provides that expressing
one thing excludes another.207 Court have even applied this
canon specifically to statutory exceptions. In doing so, courts
have explained that “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a
contrary legislative intent.”208 Applying this canon, explicit
provision of or request for de minimis exceptions in some cases
again implies they will not exist in others. Or, even more
sweepingly, when Congress provides any exceptions to a general

205. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)(B).
206. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004).
207. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002).
208. Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980); see
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
(“[I]f [sic] statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify
the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded.”).
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rule, providing those exceptions may imply that no other
exceptions, including de minimis exceptions, exist.209
However, there are a number of reasons why these canons
are not conclusive. First, at a high level, it is not clear that we
should embrace the canons at all as a means of determining
whether Treasury or courts can make de minimis rules in
situations in which Congress has not spoken. While canons have
long played an important role in statutory interpretation,
scholars have also long questioned their utility. Karl Llewellyn
famously illustrated how each canon of construction has a
counter-canon, undermining the canons’ credibility as objective
tools to make meaning of a statute.210 Since Llewellyn’s work,
many scholars have deepened the critique, arguing, among
other things, that courts may use canons as a cover to disguise
ideologically driven decisions.211 Recently, some scholars have
questioned the extent to which courts’ use of canons makes
sense in light of the realities of the legislative process.212
Legislative drafters have varying understanding of the canons,
and often the canons make assumptions that do not map onto
legislative realities.213 For instance, the fact that Congress
209. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 705 F.3d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(rejecting the EPA’s authority to create a de minimis rule, in part by
explaining, “[t]hat Congress provided only one exception to this monitoring
requirement—a shorter monitoring period—suggests that Congress did not
intend any other exceptions”).
210. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395, 401–06 (1950). But see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994) (exploring
benefits of interpretive regimes).
211. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn?
Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562
(1992) (summarizing view of some prominent scholars and judges that “canons
have actually been abused as part of the judiciary’s systematic attempt to
frustrate legislative policy preferences”).
212. For some foundational work in this area, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901, 904 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 731 (2014).
213. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 212, at 904 (exploring throughout
how canons make assumptions that may not map onto legislative process).
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explicitly referred to the possibility of a de minimis tax rule in
one part of the Code but not another may reflect different
drafting styles by different drafters at different times, not a
conscious decision to allow de minimis rules in one place but not
the other.
Second, even assuming canons have value in some contexts,
it is not clear that they apply indiscriminately to all
interpreters. Canons historically have been judicial interpretive
tools.214 While it is debatable whether legislative drafters
actually mean for courts to apply them, legislative drafters may
at least expect at some level that courts will use these judicially
fashioned tools.215 In contrast, it is even less clear that
legislative drafters intend or expect agencies to rely on canons
of construction. Agency officials and legislative drafters often
work in close relationships to develop statutes.216 As a result,
legislative drafters may expect that agency officials have an
inside understanding of their intention with respect to the
statute. This inside understanding may include a sense that
Congress did not mean for the agency to apply a tax provision
when the tax liability or taxpayer were insignificant.217 Even
absent a claim of inside information, Congress generally expects
implementing agencies to exercise discretion in carrying out

214. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 671 (1992) (“The canons are
attractive judicial tools simply because they permit judges to decide cases
without invoking substantive principles of right and wrong.”).
215. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 212, at 929 (finding varying
degrees of familiarity by legislative drafters with judicial canons of
construction).
216. See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1377, 1377 (2017).
217. See, e.g., Adirondack Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 740 F.3d 692, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (“And when countervailed by a broad grant of authority contained
within the same statutory scheme, the canon is a poor indicator of Congress’
intent.”). On the other hand, many have argued that canons help create
objective meaning for statutes. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor
Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1305 (2020) (explaining that the “linguistic
canons are widely heralded as ‘rule-like,’ ‘predictable,’ and ‘objective’
interpretive tools”). It is arguably problematic for an agency to be able to defeat
objective meaning that can be understood through the use of canons. As
already mentioned, however, the notion that canons do in fact create objective
meaning is widely subject to debate.
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statutes.218 Courts have suggested that canons of construction
may be “especially feeble . . . where Congress is presumed to
have left to reasonable agency discretion questions that it has
not directly resolved.”219
Finally, even assuming that canons are useful tools of
construction that a specific interpreter should apply, it is often
unclear what interpretation the canons should yield in the given
context.220 In the case at hand, the fact that Congress explicitly
creates or asks for a de minimis tax rule in some instances does
not necessarily mean that Congress means to preclude de
minimis tax rules in others. Rather, explicitly creating or
requesting de minimis rules in some places may simply mean
that Congress is requiring them in these places while leaving
the matter to the discretion of the implementing agency in other
places.
2.

Separation of Powers

Rather than being a straightforward statutory
interpretation question, regulatory de minimis tax rules raise
more fundamental questions about separation of powers and
administrative and judicial authority: When Congress has
provided general rules and has not explicitly authorized an
agency or court to create exceptions, do agencies or courts still
have the authority to do so? Is providing such exceptions
inherent in administrative or judicial powers? Or would creating
exceptions to the general law set down by Congress undermine
Congress’s lawmaking power?
As an initial matter, it is worthwhile to note that courts
rarely create their own de minimis tax law exceptions. There are
some cases in which courts do so, or at least seem to encourage
218. See Walker, supra note 216, at 1417 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank
(S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“Congress, when it left ambiguity in
a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion
the ambiguity allows.”).
219. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing
Cheney R. Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
220. See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (“The
force of any negative implication, however, depends on context.”).
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legislative creation of such exceptions. For instance, courts have
long wrestled with the question of when states can impose
obligations to collect and remit sales tax on out-of-state
sellers.221 In a 2018 opinion, the Supreme Court found that
states can impose such obligations on out-of-state sellers even
when such sellers do not have a physical presence in the state,
at least under certain conditions.222 The Court was careful to
point out that these conditions were met in the case in part
because the state at issue only imposed such obligations on
“sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into
[the State] or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for
the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual
basis.”223 The Court also indicated that the outcome might be
different for “small businesses with only de minimis contacts”
with the state.224 The Court thus seemed to require some sort of
de minimis exception to imposition of state tax obligations.
However, this decision was not as much an issue of tax law as it
was an interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.225 Pursuant to that clause, federal courts have
long had power to ensure that states do not unduly burden
interstate commerce.226 The Court’s almost singular turn to a de
minimis tax rule in the context of interstate commerce thus
underscores the general phenomenon: courts do not tend to craft
their own de minimis tax law exceptions.
This makes sense in light of the framework that courts have
adopted for statutory interpretation and administrative
deference. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

221. See generally, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504
U.S. 298 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)
(prior treatments by the Court).
222. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2087 (“The question is whether the out-of-state seller can be
held responsible for its payment, and this turns on a proper interpretation of
the Commerce Clause.”).
226. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945)
(“[I]n general Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus
interpreting the commerce clause in its application . . . .”).
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Defense Council, Inc.,227 where the statute permits multiple
interpretations, courts will defer to the interpretation of the
implementing agency as long as the interpretation is
reasonable.228 Accordingly, if a tax statute does not require a de
minimis tax rule, and the agency has decided not to create one,
courts would tend to defer to the agency’s decision as a
reasonable exercise of administrative authority. As a result, it
would be unusual for courts in the tax context to create de
minimis rules when the agency has not already done so.
Instead, Treasury is the principal creator of non-statutory
de minimis tax rules. Treasury does so by making many
regulatory de minimis tax rules, such as the SSTB de minimis
rule.229 However, as it turns out, it is not clear whether Treasury
has the authority to make such exceptions.
Judicial doctrine has repeatedly recognized implicit
administrative authority to create regulatory de minimis
exceptions. In a seminal case, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,230
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained,
Categorical exemptions may also be permissible as an
exercise of agency power, inherent in most statutory
schemes, to overlook circumstances that in context may
fairly be considered de minimis. It is commonplace, of course,
that the law does not concern itself with trifling matters, and
this principle has often found application in the
administrative context.231

Indeed, the Alabama Power court even suggested that the
administrative authority to create de minimis exceptions “is a
cousin of the doctrine that, notwithstanding the ‘plain meaning’
of a statute, a court must look beyond the words to the purpose
of the act where its literal terms lead to ‘absurd or futile

227. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
228. See id. at 843 (“If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute . . . . Rather . . . the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
229. See supra notes 190–193 and accompanying text.
230. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
231. Id. at 360.
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results.’”232 In support of such ideas, some scholars have
underscored the role of de minimis authority as part of a
cost-benefit balancing approach to regulation.233
Notwithstanding this support for agency authority to create
de minimis rules, under longstanding judicial doctrine there are
also clear exceptions to such authority. First, the Alabama
Power court itself explained that agencies could not create de
minimis exceptions when the statute itself is “extraordinarily
rigid,”234 a suggestion that has precluded the ability of agencies
to create de minimis exceptions in important cases.235
More significantly for the tax context, courts have explained
that “de minimis power is strictly limited; an agency can’t use it
to create an exception where application of the literal terms [of
the statute] would ‘provide benefits, in the sense of furthering
the regulatory objectives, but the agency concludes that the
acknowledged benefits are exceeded by the costs.’”236 In other
words, an agency cannot create a de minimis rule, even if such
a rule is justified on cost-benefit grounds, if the rule undermines
a benefit provided by the statute. As a result, in Waterkeeper
Alliance v. EPA,237 the D.C. Circuit struck down a regulatory
exception the EPA had created to statutory reporting
requirements, even though the EPA had concluded that such
exception was justified because it “could not foresee a situation
where the Agency would initiate a response action as a result of
such notification” and that “federal response is impractical and
unlikely.”238

232. Id. at 360 n.89 (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310
U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
233. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1651, 1668–72 (2001) (exploring de minimis rules as part of a more
general cost-benefit approach).
234. Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360.
235. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(finding that Congress adopted an “extraordinarily rigid” position in the
Delaney Clause, which does not allow the FDA to create “an implicit de
minimis exception for carcinogenic dyes with trivial risks to humans”).
236. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 360–61).
237. 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
238. Id. at 535–36.
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The fact that agencies do not have authority to create de
minimis exceptions (or exceptions generally) when literal
application of the statute would “provide benefits” places in
doubt Treasury’s authority to create de minimis exceptions in
regulations. At one level, it is somewhat difficult to map the
existing judicial authority onto the tax context. Generally,
judicial analysis of de minimis exceptions has occurred in
contexts like environmental or health regulation, in which costs
and benefits of regulation are somewhat apparent: the cost of
the regulation is typically a quantifiable private compliance
cost, while the benefit of the regulation is typically a readily
apparent public benefit, such as improved public health or
environmental remediation. In some ways, the tax context
differs from these other regulatory regimes because the benefit
of the tax law is not as obvious. No lives are saved (at least not
directly)
through
improved
healthcare
or
reduced
environmental contaminants as a result of the tax law.239
Notwithstanding this difference, however, it is clear that there
is a public benefit from the tax law, and that public benefit is
raising revenue.240
And yet, the de minimis rules Treasury creates in
regulations often seem to undermine the regulatory benefit of
revenue raising. Take, as just one example, the de minimis
exception to the definition of SSTBs in the § 199A regulations.
As illustrated previously, creating the de minimis exception
engendered significant reductions in revenue.241 For example,
under a strict interpretation of the statute with no de minimis
exception, a business with gross receipts of $100 million, 4.5
percent of which are attributable to the performance of services
that would clearly constitute an SSTB under the statute, would
239. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and
Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 533–37 (2013) (exploring “Why What’s
Good for Environmental Law Isn’t Good for Tax”).
240. As scholars have noted, the tax law is also used to do other things,
such as promote certain government policies. See generally David A. Weisbach
& Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE
L.J. 955 (2004) (exploring the use of the tax law to conduct non-tax programs
as a matter of institutional design). To the extent that the tax law is being
used to do other things in a given instance, the benefit would have to be
evaluated in terms of these other objectives.
241. See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
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not have been eligible for the qualified business income
deduction.242 In contrast, under the de minimis rule adopted by
Treasury, the entire $100 million of the business’s gross income
would remain eligible for the qualified business income
deduction.243 In this case, and other cases in which regulatory
de minimis tax rules except seemingly insignificant taxpayers
or transactions from the generally applicable tax law, the de
minimis tax rules undermine the revenue raising benefit that
would have been conferred by a strict application of the statute.
In so doing, they seem to violate the judicial stricture that “an
agency can’t use [a de minimis rule] to create an exception where
application of the literal terms would ‘provide benefits, in the
sense of furthering the regulatory objectives.’”244
Some might argue that, with the SSTB de minimis rule,
Treasury was actually defining what is an SSTB, which is
ambiguous under the statute, rather than exempting taxpayers
from the generally applicable law under the statute. Under this
reasoning, Treasury would arguably have the authority to issue
the de minimis rule, notwithstanding the revenue reduction.245
In some cases it may be true that a de minimis rule is Treasury’s
interpretation of the generally applicable law, rather than an
exception Treasury is putting in place for administrative
reasons. However, in the case of the SSTB de minimis rule,
Treasury itself actually justified the de minimis rule as a
departure from the statute on the basis of administrative
burdens, not an interpretation of what is an SSTB under the
statute.246 Such an exception, judicial authority tells us, is
unjustified if it undermines the benefit of the statute,247 as the
revenue-reducing SSTB de minimis rule does.
Others might argue that revenue raising was not the goal
of the SSTB rule. As a result, Treasury may have been
242. See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
244. Waterkeeper, 853 F.3d at 535 (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 323, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
245. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (providing the Secretary of the Treasury the
authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations” for enforcement of
the tax law).
246. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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authorized to create the de minimis exception even to the extent
it reduced revenue. This is a tough argument to make, however,
because it was notoriously unclear what the goal of the SSTB
rule was.248 In the absence of any clear justification, the default
assumption that the Code is designed to raise revenue makes
the most sense, and the de minimis rule clearly undermined
such revenue raising, as already explored. In any event,
Treasury did not attempt to justify the de minimis rule as being
consistent with the overall goal of the SSTB rules.249
Of course, Treasury often has good justifications for making
regulatory de minimis tax rules. These justifications are
generally a sense that, even if strict application of the tax law
would raise revenue, it simply is not worth the effort in a given
context. Strict application may require too much of the agency’s
own enforcement resources, or the problem may be that the
compliance costs would be too high for taxpayers, or some
combination of these concerns. Indeed, as alluded to previously,
Treasury justified the § 199A de minimis rule on just these
bases.250
However, judicial doctrine is clear that costliness of
enforcing the statute will have little power to justify a de
minimis rule when strict application of the statute would
produce regulatory benefits.251 For this reason, the Waterkeeper
court required strict application of statutory reporting
requirements even when the EPA concluded that “federal
response [to such reporting] is impractical and unlikely.”252
Likewise, other courts have similarly concluded that agencies
may not create de minimis exceptions when there are benefits
engendered by strict application of the statute, even if costs
outweigh benefits.253 As applied in the tax context, for example,
Treasury should presumably not be entitled to create a de
248. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
252. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
253. See, e.g., Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“It is not sufficient that the agency may believe that the costs outweigh the
benefits, for Congress has already made the judgment that the benefits of
regulation are sufficient.”).
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minimis rule on its own that raises the reporting requirements
for independent contractors, even if the IRS would never audit
taxpayers below a much higher threshold amount than $600.
Likewise, Treasury would seem not to have the authority to
eliminate from the definition of an SSTB a business that would
qualify, simply because it would be too burdensome for Treasury
and taxpayers to be subject to the rule.
To be sure, some courts, including the Alabama Power
court, have indicated that, separate from de minimis authority,
“[c]onsiderations of administrative necessity may be a basis for
finding implied authority for an administrative approach not
explicitly provided in the statute.”254 As a result, for instance,
“[c]ourts frequently uphold streamlined agency approaches or
procedures where the conventional course, typically
case-by-case determinations, would, as a practical matter,
prevent the agency from carrying out the mission assigned to it
by Congress.”255 However, the agency’s burden of justifying such
an approach is “especially heavy” when, as with de minimis
exceptions in tax regulations, the exception prospectively
excuses a group of transactions or taxpayers from statutory
application.256 Thus, while administrative necessity may, in
some cases, justify certain de minimis tax rules, it would be an
uphill battle for Treasury to claim authority to create such rules
prospectively in regulations. In any event, Treasury is not
routinely providing any sort of justifications that attempts to
meet such “especially heavy” burdens.
IV. LESSONS FOR THE DESIGN OF DE MINIMIS TAX RULES
As illustrated in the prior Parts, de minimis rules play a
pervasive and important role in the tax system. However, they
are subject to a number of underappreciated problems that
threaten their efficacy and legitimacy. This does not mean that
de minimis tax rules should be abandoned. Rather, they should
be put in place only when policymakers determine that their
benefits outweigh their costs and that they are preferable over

254.
255.
256.

Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 359.
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less formal administrative discretion. They should also be
designed with the lessons from this Article in mind.
A.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Generally

De minimis tax rules should be the product of a careful
weighing of costs and benefits. Even without considering some
of the unintended costs of de minimis tax rules (such as
inequities for taxpayers left subject to the generally applicable
tax law), excepting certain taxpayers or transactions from the
tax law reduces revenue. As a result, at a minimum, the
reduction in taxpayer compliance costs and government
enforcement costs from de minimis tax rules should outweigh
the reduction in tax revenue. At present, not all de minimis tax
rules reflect such an analysis.
As an example, consider the de minimis rule that excepts
certain “small” businesses from having to report on the accrual
method, which was originally defined by a threshold of $5
million of gross receipts.257 The legislative history to § 448,
enacted in 1986, describes the small business exception as
follows:
The Congress believed that small businesses should be
allowed to continue to use the cash method of accounting in
order to avoid the high costs of compliance which will result
if they are forced to change from the cash method.258

In other words, Congress carved out a business size
threshold ($5 million) under which it believed the compliance
costs did not merit the more complex rules for accrual method
accounting. Over thirty years later, Congress expanded the de
minimis threshold to $25 million as part of the TCJA.259 This
fivefold increase of the de minimis threshold far exceeds what
an increase based on an inflation adjustment would have

257.
258.

See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99th CONG. GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 475 (Comm. Print 1987).
259. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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been.260 Additionally, the TCJA legislative history does not
indicate that the expansion of the threshold was due to any
increase in costs or complexity in the accrual method of
accounting for taxpayers over time.261 The TCJA expansion thus
took a de minimis rule originally justified by cost-benefit
analysis and expanded its scope with no clear justification, other
than to benefit affected businesses.
As a broader design point, when considering de minimis
exceptions, policymakers should look for a clearly favorable
tradeoff between compliance and administrative savings from
the rule, relative to the resulting revenue loss. Taxpayer claims
that a tax rule is burdensome should not automatically give way
to a de minimis rule; all taxes create “burdens” by design. The
regulatory de minimis exception for SSTBs in the wake of the
TCJA serves as another example of when such a cost-benefit
analysis did not appear to happen; rather, industries simply
(and successfully) claimed the law would harm them to avoid
application of the SSTB limitations.262
In addition to a general cost-benefit analysis of all de
minimis tax rules, policymakers should use more granular
cost-benefit analysis to determine what type of de minimis rule
might make sense in a given context. First, the size of a de
minimis threshold should correspond to the complexity of the
underlying tax rule. As discussed above, a relatively small de
minimis threshold for reporting and paying self-employment tax
($400) might sensibly reflect the fact that reporting
self-employment taxes is not a significant burden.263 More
complicated regimes justify larger exemptions. Along similar
lines, although exemptions should be adjusted to account for
inflation or other increasing costs, de minimis thresholds
shouldn’t otherwise be raised without justification.
260. Five million dollars in 1986 would be worth roughly $11.5 million in
2019. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://perma.cc
/37X2-L5PJ (calculated from January 1986 to January 2019).
261. The Joint Committee explanation merely states: “The provision
expands the universe of taxpayers that may use the cash method of
accounting.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
PUBLIC LAW 115-97, at 112 (Comm. Print 2018).
262. See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part II.B.1.
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Second, the cost of applying the de minimis threshold
should be taken into account in weighing the benefits of a de
minimis rule. Some rules impose clear de minimis
thresholds—for example, the $15,000 de minimis threshold for
gift tax.264 But other de minimis rules are more complicated to
apply—for example, the regulatory de minimis rule for
determining SSTB status under § 199A.265 Recall that the rule
allows taxpayers to avoid SSTB classification if less than 10
percent (5 percent for larger businesses) of their gross receipts
are attributable to services that constitute an SSTB.266 This rule
requires businesses to understand the very complicated rules
about which business segments may constitute SSTBs, even if
they meet the de minimis exception. Moreover, as alluded to
previously, businesses still have to carefully monitor their
receipts to see if they qualify for the exception.267 If taxpayers
have to incur costs to monitor their compliance with a de
minimis threshold, this runs directly counter to the benefits
conferred by de minimis rules. De minimis thresholds like these,
which do little to alleviate compliance costs and may even
increase them, should be viewed as suspect and subject to
particularly careful cost-benefit analysis.
In contrast, policymakers should generally strive for de
minimis rules that are easy to apply. This is particularly
important if the purpose of a de minimis rule is to protect
unsophisticated parties from complex tax regimes. Consider
again the de minimis rule for below-market gift loans, which
exempts small loans from the complicated imputed interest
rules of § 7872.268 At first, application of the $10,000 threshold
appears easy to apply; a parent can disregard the imputed rules
for loans below the threshold. But the statute layers in
complexities that undercut the threshold’s simplicity. For
example, the statute states that the $10,000 de minimis rule will
not apply to loans that are used to purchase income producing
264. See I.R.C. § 2503 (gift exclusion); id. § 6019 (gift tax return
requirement); Frequently Asked Questions on Gift Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://perma.cc/B9FT-8534 (last updated Nov. 9, 2020).
265. See supra notes 190–195 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 190–195 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
268. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2).
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property.269 Further complicating the de minimis exception is
another rule that says the gift loan can actually be up to
$100,000 without imputed interest, as long as the borrower does
not have net investment income over $1,000.270
In isolation, these rules might make sense. However, query
whether the goal of a de minimis rule for gift loans is thwarted
by these backstops, at least in some cases. We can imagine, for
example, a parent gifting a child $10,000 to make a down
payment on a property, and because the property yields income,
unwittingly ending up subject to the imputed interest rules.
Complicated de minimis rules—those with anti-abuse
measures, for example—are more justifiable when the de
minimis rules primarily benefit sophisticated parties. However,
to the extent some complexity is necessary in applying a de
minimis tax rule, it should be weighed against the overall
compliance costs saved by having a de minimis exception.
Third, where possible, de minimis rules should be designed
to minimize behavioral distortions. If taxpayers alter their
behavior to avoid application of a tax rule and qualify for a de
minimis exception, this distortion imposes further costs on the
tax system. In particular, the use of a “cliff” —a set dollar
threshold under or over which the rule changes suddenly271
—should be avoided when taxpayers are likely to change their
behavior to avoid application of the cliff. In those situations,
phase-ins/phase-outs may be a better policy choice. For example,
if taxpayers lose the benefit of a deduction over a certain income
threshold, the deduction could be reduced gradually for each
dollar over the income threshold a taxpayer earns, until it
phases out completely at a certain level. Such a phase out makes
the marginal cost of exceeding the threshold much lower.

269. Id. § 7872(c)(2)(B).
270. See id. § 7872(d) (listing special rules for gift loans). The rule states
that, for individual loans not exceeding $100,000, imputed interest will not
exceed net investment income. Id. However, net investment income of $1000
or less is treated as zero for purposes of this rule. Id. § 7872(d)(1)(E)(ii).
271. See Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects in the
Internal Revenue Code and Proposals for Change, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 933
(2016) (explaining that “cliff effects” can cause two similarly situated
taxpayers to face different liabilities).
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Legislators seemed to take this cost into account in drafting
the statutory de minimis exception to § 199A; recall that rule
imposes a taxable income threshold over which the statute’s
more complex provisions apply.272 For taxpayers whose income
is over the de minimis threshold, however, the deduction phases
out gradually.273
On the other hand, as some commentators mentioned in
practical analysis of the 199A regulations, the regulatory de
minimis rule for SSTBs does create a cliff effect, whereby
crossing the line into having just a bit more gross receipts from
SSTB activity would disqualify the business from the § 199A
deduction entirely.274 This was a consequential design decision
that may have outsized impacts on taxpayer behavior. Tax
scholarship offers a robust “efficiency” framework for analyzing
these very sort of design decisions that impact taxpayer
behavior, but it was not brought to bear in this case.275 Future
de minimis tax rules should be created with more cognizance of
the costs they may create, and a clearer weighing of such costs
against benefits.
B.

Comparison with Less Formal Administrative Discretion

When considering de minimis tax rules, policymakers
should also compare them with the use of less formalized
administrative discretion, including policies of nonenforcement
for insignificant violations. As suggested previously, while de
minimis tax rules are designed to solve administrative
problems, they actually somewhat perversely (or at least

272. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Eric Yauch, Fiscal-Year Passthroughs Get a Break in Final
199A Rules, 162 TAX NOTES 547, 547 (2019) (detailing Treasury’s
acknowledgement of cliff effect as well as resulting concern and planning ideas
by taxpayers).
275. For one canonical article describing the application of efficiency
analysis to tax law, see generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine,
and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). Joel Slemrod
has examined in depth the type of “notches” that create cliff effects. See
generally Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and Notches in Tax System
Design, 11 EJ. OF TAX RSCH. 259 (2013).
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unexpectedly) do so by hampering administrative discretion.276
This results in many of the problems identified previously with
locking in a permanent solution to a temporary problem.277 For
instance, when Congress codified the OID rules to alleviate the
burden of tracking small amounts of hidden interest, Congress
also foreclosed the role of the tax administrator in developing,
or changing, administrative solutions as the underlying
tracking problem changed. While Congress of course could
revisit the de minimis rules it created, formally enacting de
minimis rules creates substantial barriers to flexible policy
changes over time.
In contrast, similar decisions can be made through less
formal administrative guidance. For instance, there is no fringe
benefit rule under § 132 or elsewhere that excludes from income
the free personal use of an employer-provided smartphone.278
Such a benefit is not contemplated by Treasury Regulations
under § 132, and does not clearly fit under the statutory
definition of de minimis fringes, given the potential frequency of
personal smartphone use.279 Yet the IRS has stated, in informal
guidance, that it will treat employer-provided cellphones as de
minimis (and nontaxable) as long as the primary purpose of the
phone is business use.280
Given that similar objectives can be achieved through less
formal enforcement discretion, when should Congress choose to
enact de minimis rules? When should Treasury do so in
regulations? Or when should both Congress and Treasury avoid
formal adoption, in favor of providing more discretion to the
administrator through less formal policies and procedures?
As a general matter, formal legislation and regulation have
some benefits that, while far from perfect, still have some
advantages over less formal administrative action. The
regulatory process is supposed to be imbued with procedures,
276. See supra Part III.B.2.
277. See supra Part III.B.2.
278. See I.R.C. § 132.
279. Id. § 132(e)(1) (“[A]fter taking into account the frequency . . . .”).
280. See Tax Treatment of Employer-Provided Cell Phones, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 19, 2011), https://perma.cc/HU49-9YQQ (“The value of
the business use of an employer-provided cell phone is excludable from an
employee’s income . . . .”).
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like notice and comment, that stand in the stead of some of the
inherent legitimacy of congressional procedures.281 In theory, at
least, transparency and participation in the formal legislative
and regulatory process provide constituents a means of holding
elected leaders accountable for the law Congress passes and its
administration by the agency.282 Less formal administrative
action lacks many of these hallmarks. And, as many barriers as
there may be to challenging regulations as being in violation of
a statute,283 it is even harder to challenge tax enforcement
policy, or, more specifically, administrative decisions not to
enforce the law.284 Pushing de minimis tax rules into less formal
enforcement policy thus has downsides, including making it less
likely that decisions will be subject to judicial review.285
On the other hand, the stakes of informal enforcement
policies are likely to be much lower, and possibly less subject to
281. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
461, 541–44 (2003) (exploring role of notice-and-comment procedures in
legitimizing administrative action).
282. See, e.g., Clinton G. Wallace, Tax Policy and Our Democracy, 118
MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2020) (exploring how transparency is necessary for
accountability, which is a fundamental tenet of democracy).
283. As scholars and courts have long noted, pro-taxpayer regulations are
rarely struck down, because of standing issues: taxpayers benefitted by the
regulation are unlikely to challenge it and standing generally does not exist to
challenge the lowered tax burdens of others. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (lack of standing
to challenge taxpaying of others); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984)
(same). Other procedural challenges also stand in the way of challenging tax
regulations. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Gerald Kerska, Restoring the Lost
Anti-Injunction Act, 103 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1707–12 (2017) (exploring the role
of the Anti-Injunction Act in stymieing challenges to tax regulations).
284. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (internal
citations omitted)
This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years
that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed
to an agency’s absolute discretion. This recognition of the existence
of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general
unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse
enforcement.
285. Urska Velikonja, Accountability for Nonenforcement, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2018) (“As long as a change in enforcement policy is not
prospective and categorical, it is immune from judicial review.”).
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industry lobbying. Most informal de minimis rules, like the
employer-provided mobile phone example, involve the
nonreporting of relatively small amounts of income. It would be
highly unlikely, based on precedent at least, for the IRS to
announce an informal policy exempting multi-million-dollar
transactions from a tax rule. It would certainly be unusual to
see an informal nonenforcement policy on the same scale as the
SSTB de minimis rule lobbied for under the § 199A regulations.
Thus, it is possible that limiting Treasury’s authority to make
de minimis rules would actually reduce or eliminate de minimis
rules that reflect special interests. Moreover, it is important to
remember that many regulatory de minimis tax rules are not
easily justified as a matter of administrative authority.286 They
often reduce revenue in a way that judicial authority suggests
cannot be justified easily as a matter of avoiding administrative
cost.287
All of this suggests the following: Congress and Treasury
should think hard about whether an announced form of
administrative discretion would suffice to meet a current
administrative problem before locking in a more permanent
administrative solution in the form of a statutory or regulatory
de minimis rule. It may well be the case that, as a definitional
matter, Congress believes that a certain subset of taxpayers or
transactions should not be subject to the generally applicable
tax law. If that is the case, and Congress wants that decision to
remain the same over time, Congress may very well want to
embrace the rule as a de minimis exception in a tax statute.
Moreover, if Congress does not do so, and Treasury believes that
interpreting the statute requires such a de minimis exception, it
would be more legitimate for Treasury to adopt such an
approach in notice-and-comment regulations, rather than
through a less formal policy of nonenforcement. However, if
Congress has not embraced the exception as a definitional
matter in the statute and Treasury does not feel the statute
otherwise compels such an exception as a matter of
interpretation, then Treasury should think hard about when it
really needs a de minimis tax rule. When pressed for de minimis
286.
287.

See supra Part III.D.2.
See supra Part III.D.2.
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tax rules in regulations, Treasury’s default approach should not
be to grant such rules whenever they would make
administration easier. As judicial authority has indicated, when
strict application of the statute would result in greater revenue
raising, it should only be the exceptional administrative burden
or very little revenue at stake that convinces Treasury that a de
minimis tax rule is actually justified in a regulation.288 And, as
a matter of administrative flexibility, if the de minimis rule is
addressing a current, administrative problem, informal
discretion may be preferable, to allow the agency to revisit the
problem as it changes over time. The agency can announce its
nonenforcement policy, thereby salvaging at least some of the
transparency that would otherwise be lost by moving from a de
minimis rule to nonenforcement.289
C.

Design Considerations

Finally, when Congress or Treasury decides that the
cost-benefit analysis points in favor of de minimis rules, such
rules should be designed with the lessons of this Article in mind.
In particular, three such design principles are highlighted
below: De minimis tax rules that benefit sophisticated parties
should be subject to particularly high scrutiny, de minimis rules
that rely on dollar thresholds should be periodically adjusted,
and policymakers should consider how to more carefully tailor
procedural de minimis tax rules to reduce the impact on
substantive law.
1.

De Minimis Tax Rules that Benefit Sophisticated Parties
Should Be Subject to Particularly High Scrutiny

First, any de minimis tax rule aimed at sophisticated
parties should be subject to extra scrutiny. As discussed in Part
II, de minimis rules serve a variety of functions, with many such
rules protecting smaller and/or less sophisticated parties from
complicated tax schemes. In this way, de minimis rules sort
different types of taxpayers into different tax regimes. The
288. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
transparency benefits of categorical nonenforcement).
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justification for de minimis tax rules that primarily benefit
sophisticated parties is not always readily apparent, as
presumably these are the very taxpayers more complex tax
schemes are intended to capture.
However, even for sophisticated parties, policymakers may
choose to carve out (relatively) modest transactions where the
compliance costs associated with a particular tax scheme cannot
be justified by the revenue. This can be seen in rules like the
fifteen-day de minimis exception for reporting vacation homes
or the built-in loss rules under § 382, as well as the de minimis
exceptions for REITs.290 Although such rules are not justified by
the parties being unfairly subjected to an overly complex regime,
they may very well be justified by the tradeoff of tax revenue for
compliance costs and IRS enforcement costs.
However, there are particular risks associated with de
minimis rules in the context of sophisticated transactions. One,
which we have highlighted above, is that sophisticated parties
are more likely to lobby for favorable de minimis rules that may
not be justified on cost-benefit grounds.291 These parties have
the resources to engage in this lobbying and more at stake in
securing the protection of a de minimis rule. Further, describing
a special benefit as a “de minimis rule” may be a low salience
way for sophisticated players to gain tax benefits that are
unjustified by general cost-benefit tradeoffs. Again, the
cost-benefit tradeoff should be a tradeoff between tax revenue
lost by the de minimis rule and compliance and enforcement
costs saved, not the tax liability savings to the taxpayer. As
stated above, all tax rules impose burdens and will impose costs
on taxpayers. The regulatory process leading to the SSTB de
minimis rule serves as a stark example of how sophisticated
parties may use the term “de minimis” to simply avoid
application of an unfavorable rule.292 Going forward,
policymakers would be wise to require a detailed cost-benefit
analysis before creating de minimis rules that benefit
sophisticated parties.

290.
291.
292.

See supra notes 98–109 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
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De Minimis Rules that Rely on Dollar Thresholds Should
Be Periodically Adjusted

Next, as we have highlighted throughout this Article, many
de minimis tax rules rely on a dollar threshold to define the
taxpayer or transaction that is small enough to be considered de
minimis.293 However, as discussed above, what constitutes
“small” is likely to change over time due to inflation and/or other
factors. The $600 threshold for issuing a Form 1099-MISC is a
perfect example of a de minimis rule that has never been
indexed and arguably should be adjusted.294
One obvious way to make adjustments to de minimis tax
rules is to write into the original rule that the threshold will be
indexed for inflation. Many, but not all, de minimis thresholds
do this; and there appears to be no rhyme or reason as to why
some are indexed and others are not. For example, the threshold
for reporting and paying household employment taxes
(currently $2,200) is indexed for inflation,295 as is the gift tax
threshold.296 However, the threshold for reporting and paying
self-employment tax ($400) is not;297 arguably this threshold
could now be much higher.
Many, perhaps most, de minimis thresholds related to more
complex rules are also not indexed for inflation. For example,
the $10,000 de minimis thresholds for both below-market loans
and OID have been in place for decades without adjustment.298
A notable exception is the statutory de minimis threshold for
application of § 199A. The complex provisions in § 199A relating
to wages and depreciable property apply only to taxpayers over
a taxable income threshold, which is indexed annually for
inflation.299
Indexing all dollar thresholds for inflation would mean each
rule maintained the scope originally intended by Congress, at

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21, 84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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least in dollar terms, over many years. But there are tradeoffs
to consider when indexing de minimis rules. One is complexity—
a de minimis rule that does not change is simpler than a rule
that does. Making the inflation adjustment itself is relatively
simple; the tax law does this in numerous places and Treasury
simply relies on a preset inflation index to do so.300 However,
changing thresholds may make it harder for taxpayers to plan
as they have to keep track of a moving target. A taxpayer may
also inadvertently fall subject to the non-de minimis regime by
failing to keep track of the moving threshold. For example, we
can imagine a taxpayer might have heard at some point that the
gift tax threshold was $14,000, and not realize that in a later
year the threshold is $15,000.
Another consideration is that the compliance costs that de
minimis thresholds are designed to avoid may also change over
time. In particular, technological advancements may make
certain procedural compliance requirements—like issuing tax
forms—significantly easier and cheaper. This makes the
desirability of raising de minimis thresholds uncertain.
Returning to the example of the $600 threshold for Form 1099,
it is clear that the threshold captures transactions that are
much “smaller” in real dollar terms than Congress intended in
1954.301 If compliance costs were unchanged since then, this
would likely be a bad result. If Congress deemed the revenue at
stake for a $599 transaction unworthy of the compliance costs
related to a Form 1099, then the revenue at stake for a $600
transaction today would clearly not justify those compliance
costs.
However, it is likely far easier to issue a Form 1099 to a
payee in the twenty-first century than it was in the 1950s when
Congress enacted the $600 de minimis rule. Forms can be
distributed to taxpayers electronically, and payroll software can
make IRS filings on a relatively low-cost basis.302 With much

300. See I.R.C. § 199A(e)(2)(B)(i–ii) (detailing how to adjust the threshold
amount for inflation).
301. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
302. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Modern Case for Withholding, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 96 (2019) (comparing withholding costs by larger payers
to individual payees).
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lower compliance costs, a threshold that had been indexed
annually for inflation since 1954 may be too high.
How should policymakers account for this uncertainty? One
response may be to vary the adjustment to a de minimis rule
according to the type of complexity the rule was intended to
address. De minimis rules that exempt taxpayers from complex
substantive tax rules are rules where periodic adjustments
probably make sense, because the procedural cost of applying
the tax law is less relevant to the calculus, but the threshold for
what is a small taxpayer or transaction will naturally go up in
tandem with inflation. Yet, ironically, these rules appear to be
the least often adjusted. For example, if the purpose of a $10,000
de minimis rule for below-market loans is to exempt small loans
from the complicated below-market loan rules, that threshold
should be indexed. Today, a relatively small $11,000
intra-family loan would no longer fall below the threshold, and
the imputed interest rules are no easier to understand today
than when they were when enacted. On the other hand,
adjustments to procedural de minimis rules—rules that protect
taxpayers from administrative compliance burdens rather than
complex substantive rules—should be subject to closer review,
rather than just relying on a default indexing approach. Because
compliance burdens may go down over time (particularly as
technology evolves), inflation indexing or other adjustments
may be unnecessary, or may not need to happen frequently.
Another way to deal with uncertainty regarding how to
adjust de minimis thresholds is to require periodic revisiting of
the threshold without automatic annual inflation adjustments.
For example, Congress could write a rule that requires Treasury
to adjust the Form 1099-MISC threshold every five years,
without specifically tying it to inflation.303 That would allow a
more nuanced weighing of inflation versus changing compliance
costs. Less frequent adjustments may also make it easier for
taxpayers to assess what the law is at a given time. A downside
of this approach, however, is giving Treasury discretion for how
to adjust thresholds will inevitably lead to lobbying for lower

303. Cf. James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 235, 238 (2015) (arguing for more congressional delegation of tax
lawmaking power to Treasury).
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thresholds, an approach that mechanical inflation adjustments
avoid.
3. Policymakers Should More Carefully Tailor Procedural De
Minimis Tax Rules to Reduce the Impact on Substantive Law
Finally, policymakers should more carefully construct
procedural de minimis tax rules to target costs, while
minimizing impacts on substantive tax law. As discussed
previously, taxpayers often confuse procedural de minimis tax
rules with a change in the underlying tax law.304 Many other
taxpayers, who are aware of the distinction, simply use the lack
of a filing requirement as a reason to cheat, knowing that there
will be no paper trail of the unreported income.305 This yields
inequity in addition to lack of transparency about the true
obligations imposed by the tax law.
One alternative would be for policymakers to instead enact
substantive changes to the tax law. For instance, instead of a
rule that alleviated a Form 1099-MISC requirement for
payments below $600, the underlying tax law could provide that
payments to independent contractors below $600 are not income
at all. This would make the tax law more consistent with
underlying expectations by taxpayers who are otherwise
confused and would alleviate some of the inequities that
currently favor taxpayers who use the lack of information
reporting as an opportunity to cheat.
However, such changes would present many of their own
problems. While getting a payment that falls below the
reporting threshold is currently advantageous to taxpayers
because it provides enhanced opportunities to cheat, actually
changing the underlying tax law would create significant
behavioral distortions. The new substantive law would heighten
the value of receiving consecutive payments that fall below the
threshold, or of being an independent contractor who was
potentially eligible for the exclusion. This would incentivize
taxpayers to engage in all sorts of inefficient planning to ensure
that payments are not subject to tax. It would also put more

304.
305.

See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
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pressure on the distinction between independent contractors
and employees (the latter of whom would not be eligible for the
exclusion), in a way that is somewhat nonsensical and, in any
event, would be difficult to police given the blurry line between
the two.306 Similar issues would apply in other contexts if
procedural de minimis tax rules were replaced with substantive
exemptions, resulting in great, overall revenue and efficiency
costs to the tax system.
Nonetheless, without a wholesale switch to substantive tax
law exemptions, policymakers can still craft many procedural de
minimis tax rules to reduce inordinate costs in a more targeted
way. For instance, in order to file a Form 1099-MISC, payors
must fill out multiple copies of the form, including many details
such as the social security or employer identification number of
the payee.307 The payor must then transmit these forms to
multiple parties, including to the payee and the IRS.308 And the
payor must also file a Form 1096 with the IRS that summarizes
the various information returns submitted by the payor in the
year.309 The steps involved are onerous for taxpayers making an
isolated number of small payments, hence the de minimis
threshold.
However, rather than eliminating any filing requirement at
all, policymakers could instead consider making the
requirements easier for small payments. As one possibility, the
IRS might provide on its website a printable sheet of paper that
says, “You received an independent contractor payment that is
less than $600. This is taxable and will be reported by the payor
to the IRS. Failure to report and pay tax on the payment on your
own tax return is tax fraud and is punishable by the IRS.”
Payors who make payments below the de minimis threshold
could be required to provide this printable statement to the
payee, and to report the payment on a Form 1096, along with
306. See, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games,
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1439, 1464 (2019) (discussing difficulty IRS has policing the line).
307. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2020 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORMS
1099-MISC AND 1099-NEC 3–4 (2019), https://perma.cc/53L3-EZML (PDF).
308. Id. at 1, 7.
309. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2020 FORM 1096 AND INSTRUCTIONS,
https://perma.cc/RE9T-L6MZ (PDF).
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other payments that the payor made in that year. Or, if the
payor makes no other reportable payments that year, the payor
could be required to report the payment on her annual income
tax return, rather than having any separate filing requirement
just for the payment. Eliminating additional steps, such as
filling out and appropriately distributing multiple copies of the
1099, should reduce many payors’ costs of providing the
information to payees and the IRS, while still notifying the
payees that tax liability is owed and providing the IRS some
information to track the payment.
Of course, there are costs to this alternative system. For
one, having different filing requirements for payments below the
$600 threshold makes the overall system more complex. On the
other hand, there are already different regimes for payments
below the threshold, relative to payments at or exceeding the
threshold amount. The proposed solution, or a different
alternative regime, may better achieve burden reduction while
being more mindful of potential impact on substantive tax law.
While policymakers will want to carefully consider tradeoffs in
devising particular solutions, they should at the least be more
cognizant of how, at present, procedural de minimis tax rules
create de facto substantive tax law. In this, and the many other
ways described above, more careful attention to the role of de
minimis tax rules can lead to more sensible design.
CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth a comprehensive analysis of de
minimis tax rules, which pervade the Code, but which have been
the subject of little examination. As this Article has revealed, de
minimis rules can and do play an important role in allocating
the costs of the tax system. At best, they can except insignificant
taxpayers and transactions from inordinate burdens.
But they can also have significant, deleterious effects. In
some ways, the de minimis rule in the § 199A regulations is a
glaring example of a de minimis rule gone wrong. It was adopted
in the regulations, even though Treasury acknowledged the
exception conflicted with the statute. The de minimis rule likely
had a significant, negative impact on revenue, thereby
threatening claims that Treasury had the administrative
authority to make it. It was adopted as part of an
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extraordinarily complex legal regime and did little to actually
reduce the complexity or burden of such regime. Indeed, if
anything, it actually exacerbated the complexities of the tax law,
by making it even more important to keep track of and define
“SSTB” income. Moreover, the rule conferred great advantage
on certain insider constituencies, who lobbied heavily for it. And
the drafting of the rule, with a cliff effect, is likely to engender
significant efficiency costs.
How did such a flawed de minimis rule come to pass? It is
possible that it was a badly designed fluke. But this Article
suggests there is a more problematic story: the very belief that
de minimis tax rules are insignificant has long enabled insiders
to lobby for them while others assume that they do not matter
that much. This can result in significant, and poorly construed,
giveaways to powerful taxpayers, with little pushback. Even
when the story is not one of well-organized insiders getting their
way, policymakers and commentators alike have not thought
much of de minimis rules one way or the other, leading to
suboptimal drafting and impacts on the tax system.
This Article has surveyed the extensive and varied de
minimis rules throughout the tax system. The Article has
displayed that collectively, and even individually, they matter,
no matter how “de minimis” they might seem. Hopefully, this
Article will help policymakers and commentators think
carefully about the many de minimis rules that are likely to be
requested in the future. Paying attention to these seemingly
small decisions has important, systemwide effects.

